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INTRODUCTION
Almost a decade ago, Professor Clyde Summers, the late and
renowned legal comparativist, characterized many comparative labor
law studies as purely descriptive in character—in short, a form of
academic tourism lacking in social context and critical analysis. 1 He
exhorted scholars interested in comparative labor and employment law
to illuminate the values and premises of the systems they studied and to
produce work aimed at improving formal law and practice in their home
countries. 2 Summers identified employment discrimination as an area
especially ripe for comparative study. Such work could reveal the depth
of each country’s commitment to employment equality. 3
This Article takes up that task by focusing on a central labor market
concern—that of aging and the workplace—in two countries with a
common legal heritage. More specifically, this Article compares age
discrimination law and practice in the United Kingdom (U.K.) and the
United States (U.S.) to discern convergences and divergences in legal
doctrine, the law’s normative underpinnings, and societal outcomes. In
an earlier article, using the “decent work” construct created by the
International Labour Organization (ILO), 4 the authors concluded, along
with their colleague Andrew Frazer, that the global economic crisis
negatively affected the quality of work for older workers in the U.K.
and the U.S., making employment for them “more fragile, inconstant,
and insecure.” 5 This Article assesses age discrimination law and its
basic assumptions and similarly concludes that neither country
adequately protects its aging workforce from age bias. Therefore,
changes in the law are needed to effectively shield older workers from
employer actions that result in economic vulnerability and involuntary
1. Clyde Summers, Comparative Labor Law in America: Its Foibles, Functions, and Future,
25 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 115, 115–19 (2003).
2. Id. at 119–20.
3. Id. at 125.
4. Decent work is an obligation undertaken by ILO member states requiring the promotion of
four interrelated pillars: employment promotion, social protection, social dialogue, and
fundamental rights. Susan Bisom-Rapp, Andrew Frazer & Malcolm Sargeant, Decent Work,
Older Workers and Vulnerability in the Economic Recession: A Comparative Study of Australia,
the United Kingdom, and the United States, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 43, 46 n.10 (2011)
[hereinafter Bisom-Rapp, Frazer & Sargeant, Decent Work, Older Workers]. This article also
referenced conditions in Australia.
5. Id. at 48.
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retirement.
A comparative study of British and American age discrimination law
is useful because both countries are presently grappling with high youth
unemployment, aging populations, higher than usual older worker
unemployment, and the increasing difficulty for many workers to secure
a dignified retirement. 6 Moreover, despite the similarity of these
challenges, each country at first blush appears to pursue age
discrimination protection using a distinct model. Although both the
U.K. and U.S. share a history rooted in English common law, age bias
law in the U.K. adheres to what might be termed the “European
approach.” The U.K., as a member of the European Union (EU), is
obligated to ensure that its law conforms to EU directives, which are
binding yet flexible legal measures that member countries translate into
national law. 7 While equal treatment has been a concern in Europe
since the 1970s, particularly regarding gender equality, 8 there has been
a proliferation of new anti-discrimination legislation at both the supranational and national level in the last fifteen years, including several
important EU equal employment opportunity directives. 9 The U.K.’s
age discrimination prohibition, enacted pursuant to the EU’s Framework
Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation (“Equal
Treatment Directive” or “Directive”), 10 is relatively recent, dating to
October 2006. 11 In fact, the country’s Supreme Court issued its first
decision on compulsory retirement in April 2012. 12 Thus, age
discrimination law in the U.K. is in its formative phase.
One notable aspect of U.K. law that places it within the European
approach is the broad reach of the protected class. In the U.K., workers
ages 16 and up are shielded from age bias—a recognition that age-based
stereotypes may adversely affect the young as well as the middle-aged
6. See id. at 76–92 (describing conditions in the U.K.); id. at 92–114 (describing conditions in
the U.S.).
7. ROGER BLANPAIN, SUSAN BISOM-RAPP, WILLIAM R. CORBETT, HILARY K. JOSEPHS &
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, THE GLOBAL WORKPLACE 397, 473 (2d ed. 2012) [hereinafter THE
GLOBAL WORKPLACE].
8. The EU’s first antidiscrimination law directive was adopted in 1975, and it relates to equal
pay for men and women. Id. at 451. See also Council Directive 75/117, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19
(establishing equal pay for men and women).
9. Gráinne de Búrca, The Trajectories of European and American Antidiscrimination Law, 60
AM. J. COMP. L. 1, 1–3 (2012).
10. See infra Part II.D (discussing the Directive’s age exception to employment
discrimination).
11. See infra notes 136–38 and accompanying text (discussing the Employment Equality Age
Regulations of 2006).
12. See infra Part II.D.2 (discussing the U.K.’s compulsory retirement law). See also
Malcolm Sargeant, Shades of Grey, 1 E-J. INT’L & COMP. LAB. STUD. 139, 139–43 (2012).
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and elderly. 13 But in the U.S., age discrimination is conceptualized as a
problem of older rather than younger workers. The protected class is
defined as those who are at least 40 years old, leaving those under 40
without redress for age discrimination. 14 Even within the protected
class, suits filed by chronologically younger class members challenging
policies that favor their older counterparts are not cognizable. 15
Another significant characteristic of U.K. law that aligns it with the
European approach is the possibility of employer-justified compulsory
Professor Julie Suk recently examined the legal
retirement. 16
conclusions about, and the normative underpinnings of, mandatory
retirement in Europe. In the EU, compulsory retirement is generally
viewed as a justification for differential treatment on the basis of age so
long as a given scheme is an appropriate and necessary means of
achieving a legitimate aim. 17 The proffered jurisprudential rationale for
mandatory retirement is that such programs may promote, among other
things, older worker dignity and employment opportunities for the
young. Suk describes the European approach as one “promoting a
normative vision of the ideal life cycle.” 18
In contrast to the U.K., the long-standing prohibition of age
discrimination in the U.S. generally renders mandatory retirement
illegal. In enacting the Age Discrimination Employment Act of 1967
(ADEA), 19 Congress sought the eradication of a particular evil—
employers’ inaccurate stereotypes about the productivity and
competence of older workers. 20 Under the ADEA, employees are to be
evaluated individually on the basis of merit. 21 The American approach
prohibits compulsory retirement programs in order to combat negative,
age-based stereotypes about when and how older workers should exit

13. See infra Part I.B (discussing age-based stereotypes).
14. See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing the age-protected class in the U.S.).
15. See infra notes 148–54 and accompanying text (discussing General Dynamics Land
Systems, Inc., v. Cline).
16. See infra note 228 and accompanying text (explaining the possibility of employer-justified
compulsory retirement in the U.K.).
17. Julie C. Suk, From Antidiscrimination to Equality: Stereotypes and the Life Cycle in the
United States and Europe, 60 AM. J. COMP. L. 75, 95 (2012).
18. Id. at 97. An example of the European approach to compulsory retirement is the recent
case, Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande AB, in which the European Court of Justice upheld
Swedish national legislation permitting an employer to terminate an employee at the end of the
month in which the employee reaches age 67. Case C-141/11, Hörnfeldt v. Posten Meddelande
AB, 2012 available at http://curia.europa.eu/juris/liste.jsf?language=en&num=C-141/11.
19. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–78 (2006).
20. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
21. Id. at 611.
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the labor market. 22
European scholars opposed to compulsory
retirement in their own countries cite the U.S. approach with approval. 23
Nonetheless, over time, U.S. Supreme Court decisions have greatly
weakened the ADEA’s protections, making it difficult for plaintiffs to
make out a prima facie case of age discrimination and easier for
employers to defend against suit. 24 The Court decisions have also
complicated the government’s enforcement efforts. 25 Additionally,
aggressive corporate downsizing, very laxly regulated in the U.S.,
increasingly sweeps older workers within its ambit, leaving them
without employment at a point in their lives when finding replacement
work is most difficult. 26 U.S. law at present is in no sense a model for
other countries when it comes to protecting older workers. Many older
American workers lawfully terminated by reductions in force find
themselves involuntarily and prematurely retired, cast out of their jobs
and unable to find alternative employment. 27
Indeed, despite what may appear as great doctrinal contrasts, the age
discrimination laws of the U.K. and the U.S. converge in many respects.
Both systems view age stereotyping as an ill to be cured. 28 Both
countries ultimately provide for inferior legal protections against age
discrimination as compared to other forms of prohibited workplace
bias. 29 Finally, both approaches to age discrimination render workers
vulnerable in their later working years even though each nation’s laws

22. See generally W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985) (stating that under
the ADEA, “employers are to evaluate employees . . . on their merits and not their age”); Suk,
supra note 17, at 97–98 (arguing that while Europe has promoted a “normative vision of the ideal
life cycle,” the United States has produced a “concept of equality that prevents the state from
interfering with individuals’ ability to make” retirement decisions).
23. ROGER BLANPAIN, MEMOIRS OF ROGER BLANPAIN: “WHAT CAN I DO FOR YOU?” 105
(2009).
24. See infra Part II.E (discussing the onerous burden of establishing a prima facie case of
disparate treatment under the ADEA).
25. See infra Part II.E.
26. See infra notes 308–09 and accompanying text (noting the negative effects of corporate
downsizing on older workers). See also Jessica Z. Rothenberg & Daniel S. Gardner, Protecting
Older Workers: The Failure of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 38 J. SOC. &
SOC. WELFARE 9, 21 (2011) (“The ADEA has been least effective at protecting older workers
during periods of recession, downsizing, and economic restructuring.”).
27. See Kelly Evans & Sarah E. Needleman, For Older Workers, a Reluctant Retirement,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 2009, at A17 (finding that many Americans are reluctantly forced into
retirement); Motoko Rich, For the Unemployed Over 50, Fears of Never Working Again, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 19, 2010, at A1 (reporting the difficulty of finding work for many unemployed
Americans over the age of 55).
28. See infra Part I.B (comparing U.K. and U.S. efforts to eradicate stereotypes based on age).
29. See infra Parts II.A–B (discussing the legal protections provided by the U.S. and the U.K.
against age discrimination).
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arguably arrive there by a different route. 30 Carefully examining law in
action—particularly how the law is deployed by employers—illustrates
this latter point and reveals that neither country’s commitment to
employment equality on the basis of age is sufficient.
The deficiencies plaguing both systems are traceable to the incursion
of a distinct economic imperative, applicable only to older workers, on
what should be a civil or human rights approach. 31 In other words, both
the U.S. and U.K. systems provide weakened protection from age
discrimination in the supposed service of societal economic concerns. 32
Economic vulnerability would less frequently affect older workers if the
U.K. and the U.S. followed an equal treatment approach grounded in
human rights law—an approach equal to the prohibitions of
discrimination on other bases, such as race and sex. 33 Consigning age
discrimination to a lesser or inferior protected status will only ensure
that the law will be limited in its ability to eliminate the harm it seeks to
redress. Putting age on even footing with other forms of bias is a
necessary cure in this respect.
Before advancing to this Article’s legal analysis, Part I provides a
brief review of the social science of age stereotyping, a phenomenon the
age discrimination laws in the U.K. and the U.S. aspire to eradicate.
Part I also highlights the seminal study that gave rise to age
discrimination legislation in the U.S. and summarizes several decades of

30. See infra Parts II.D–E (discussing the weaknesses in U.S. and U.K. legal protections for
age discrimination).
31. See infra Conclusion (proposing a civil or human rights approach to remedying the
deficiencies in both systems). The authors acknowledge that civil rights law, in particular
employment discrimination law, incorporates economic concerns. Indeed, all labor and
employment law exists to regulate the labor market, a site of economic activity. The focus of this
Article, however, is on the greater willingness of courts and legislatures to allow economics to
trump civil rights when interpreting or fashioning measures to eradicate age bias.
32. Malcolm Sargeant has previously made this point regarding the EU’s Framework
Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation, Directive 2000/78/EC OJ L303/16
12.2.2000. See MALCOLM SARGEANT, AGE DISCRIMINATION: AGEISM IN EMPLOYMENT AND
SERVICE PROVISION 20–24 (2011) [hereinafter SARGEANT, AGE DISCRIMINATION] (discussing
the confusion in the European debate about age discrimination due to two distinct approaches to
the problem: economic and human rights).
33. Unfortunately, a robust human rights approach to age discrimination continues to elude
the international community. See U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to the Second World
Assembly on Ageing: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 22, U.N. Doc. A/66/173 (July 22, 2011)
[hereinafter 2011 Follow-up to Second World Assembly] (“[E]xplicit references to age in core
international human rights treaties are scarce . . . .”). In fact, there is an international movement
advocating the adoption of a United Nations Convention on the Rights of Older People to fill a
gap in international law on the subject. See INPA ET AL., STRENGTHENING OLDER PEOPLE’S
RIGHTS: TOWARDS A UN CONVENTION (2010), available at http://www.helpage.org/what-wedo/rights/strengthening-older-peoples-rights-towards-a-convention/.
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research on ageism. Next, Part II offers a comparative analysis of the
doctrinal law developed for the purpose of eradicating the use of age
stereotypes in employment decision-making. Part II also considers
societal outcomes, examining law in action and describing the ways in
which many British and American older workers are rendered
vulnerable. This Article concludes with recommendations to better
protect aging employees and to assist American policymakers in
drawing lessons from the British experience and vice versa.
I. A PROBLEM TO BE SOLVED BY LAW: AGEISM AND STEREOTYPING
A. Ageism
Age discrimination is a manifestation of ageism. Ageist attitudes
continue to exist both in the U.K. and the U.S. In the U.K., for
example, studies conducted by the Department for Work and Pensions
revealed that “both negative and positive stereotypes of older persons
[are] strongly held by significant segments of the population.” 34
Similarly, numerous studies demonstrate “that many Americans hold
inaccurate and negative stereotypes against older people[,] . . . viewing
them as senile, sad, lonely, poor, sexless, ill, dependent, demented, and
disabled.” 35
The first use of the word “ageism” is attributed to Dr. Robert Butler,
who in 1969 wrote a short article about the strongly negative reaction of
white affluent middle class residents to a proposal for a public housing
project for the elderly poor in Chevy Chase, a neighborhood in
northwest Washington, D.C. 36 He described ageism as “prejudice by
one age group against other age groups.” 37 A more comprehensive and
contemporary definition is contained in a 2009 United Nations (U.N.)
report on ageing, which describes ageism as encompassing systemic,
negative stereotyping and discrimination or denial of opportunities on

34. U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing:
Comprehensive Overview: Rep. of the Secretary-General, ¶ 75, U.N. Doc. A/65/157 (July 21,
2010) [hereinafter 2010 Comprehensive Overview].
35. Richard L. Wiener & Stacie Nichols Keller, Finding the Assumptions in the Law: Social
Analytic Jurisprudence, Disability, and Aging Workers, in DISABILITY AND AGING
DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 1, 2 (Richard L. Weiner & Steven
L. Willborn eds., 2011).
36. See generally Robert N. Butler, Age-ism: Another Form of Bigotry, 9 GERONTOLOGIST
243 (1969). Race and class also loomed large in the resistance of the middle class residents—
who were white—to the plan to bring the elderly—who were mainly African American and
poor—to their community. Id. at 243–46.
37. Id. at 243.
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the basis of age. 38 The report notes that ageism “reinforces a negative
image of older persons as dependent people with declines in intellect,
cognitive and physical performance. . . . [O]lder persons are often
perceived as a burden, a drain on resources, and persons in need of
care.” 39 Such perceptions render older people vulnerable and put “their
rights at risk.” 40
While for some social scientists Dr. Butler’s work marks the
beginning of research on ageism, 41 a report published four years prior to
it has had a far greater impact on age discrimination law in the U.S.
National legislation prohibiting age discrimination in the U.S. was
preceded by a year-long study published in 1965 under the direction of
then Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz. 42 The study, commonly
known as the “Wirtz Report,” was ordered by Congress in order to
assess the need for age discrimination legislation. 43 The Wirtz Report
found significant evidence of age discrimination in the American
workplace resulting from unfounded assumptions about older
workers. 44 Nevertheless, the Report distinguished beliefs about middleaged and older workers from those affecting workers on the basis of
race, religion, color, or national origin. Unlike prejudice based on those
other characteristics, age bias was not typically driven by “dislike or
intolerance.” 45 In order to eliminate arbitrary age discrimination, the

38. U.N. Secretary-General, Follow-up to the Second World Assembly on Ageing: Rep. of the
Secretary-General, ¶ 24, U.N. Doc. A/64/127 (July 6, 2009) [hereinafter 2009 Follow-up to
Second World Assembly].
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Todd D. Nelson, Ageism: The Strange Case of Prejudice against the Older You,
in DISABILITY AND AGING DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES IN LAW AND PSYCHOLOGY 37 n.1
(Richard L. Weiner & Steven L. Willborn eds., 2011) (“I mark the beginning of research on
ageism with the coining of the term ‘age-ism’ by Butler (1969).”).
42. U.S. SEC’Y OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR TO THE CONGRESS UNDER SECTION 715
OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT]. The Report was
undertaken in the wake of passage of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which bans
employment decision-making on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, and sex. See
id. at 1 (stating that the Wirtz Report is presented in response to section 715 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
43. See Nina A. Kohn, Rethinking the Constitutionality of Age Discrimination: A Challenge to
a Decades-Old Consensus, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 213, 234 (2010).
44. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 5–9; Kohn, supra note 43, at 234.
45. Smith v. City of Jackson, 554 U.S. 228, 232 (2005); WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 5–
6. See also Howard Eglit, Age Bias in the American Workplace—An Overview, 99 J. INT’L
AGING L. & POL’Y 99, 101 (2009) [hereinafter Eglit, Age Bias] (“[A]ge-based decision making
typically is not an expression of the intense animosity that accompanies racism and its malignant
compatriots . . . .”). As the Baby Boom generation ages and consumes increasing resources, it is
possible that animosity against older people will increase.
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Wirtz Report recommended national legislation. 46 Congress acted on
the report’s recommendation and passed the ADEA in 1967. 47
Historical context is important for understanding the Wirtz Report.
At the time of the study, many American employers had policies
prohibiting the hiring of employees over a certain age. 48 These
limitations, typically set from ages 45 to 55, appeared in employment
advertisements, were communicated to applicants during the hiring
process, and were conveyed to employment agencies. 49 In response,
twenty states enacted laws prohibiting age limitations in hiring. 50 The
Wirtz Report examined the practice of age-based hiring limitations
among 540 employers, all of which at the time were located in states
that had not adopted a legal prohibition of the practice. Employers
explained the rationale for age limitations as tied to:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Physical capability.
A policy of promotion-from-within [and hence a restriction of
hiring for entry level jobs to the young].
Ability to hire younger workers for less money . . . .
Pension plans (costs and provisions), and to a much lesser extent,
costs of health and life insurance.
Lack of skills, experience, or educational requirements.
Limited work expectancy.
Training costs and low productivity.
Lack of adaptability and undesirable personal characteristics.
Desired age balance in the work force. 51

The Wirtz Report never made clear which of these explanations count
as stereotypes—the report does not use the term “stereotypes”—and
which might be legitimate concerns. Instead, it implies that at least
some of the explanations are specious. 52 That the rationales in many
cases are based on arbitrary assumptions about older workers is
evidenced, noted the Report, by the fact that older worker performance

46. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 21–22.
47. Michael C. Harper, ADEA Doctrinal Impediments to the Fulfillment of the Wirtz Report
Agenda, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 757, 762 (1997) [hereinafter Harper, Doctrinal Impediments]
(“[T]he Wirtz Report provided the initiative for Congressional passage of the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act of 1967.”).
48. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 6–7.
49. Id. at 6.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 8.
52. See id. (“It is apparent . . . that a great many age limitation policies are based in fact on
considerations quite different from those offered as their explanation.”); Harper, Doctrinal
Impediments, supra note 47, at 758 (“[T]he [Wirtz] Report did not draw definitive conclusions
about the actual explanations.”).

4_BISOMRAPP

726

3/9/2013 1:34 PM

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

[Vol. 44

is in the main “at least equal to [that of] younger workers” 53 and “the
demonstrated willingness of so many American employers to consider
older workers on their merits . . . and to hire them.” 54
There is a strong connection between the stated problem—
stereotyping or unfounded assumptions—and its potential solution—
law. Indeed, the Wirtz Report is a touchstone in American age
discrimination jurisprudence, frequently discussed as evidence of
Congress’s legislative intent in enacting the ADEA. 55 As Professor
Michael Harper notes, the Wirtz Report’s goals are “reflected in
Congressional statements in support of the [ADEA] and in the Act’s
statement of findings and purpose.” 56 Moreover, as the U.S. Supreme
Court has made clear, “Congress’[s] promulgation of the ADEA was
prompted by its concern that older workers were being deprived of
employment on the basis of inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes.” 57
Legal experts outside the U.S. consider the ADEA as the pioneering
statutory law addressing the problem of age bias. (Some even reference
the Wirtz Report in their writings. 58) Ageism and stereotyping are also
concerns in the U.K., where legislation aims to eliminate these groupbased generalizations or beliefs. 59 Additionally, one finds mention at
the supra and international level of the need to eradicate age
stereotyping through legislative action. 60
Social scientific
understanding of age stereotypes and their relationship to employment
discrimination, however, has advanced considerably since the Wirtz
Report. 61

53. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 8.
54. Id. at 9.
55. For discussions of the Wirtz Report, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232, 235
n.5, 238 (2005); Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 587, 589–90 (2004); W.
Airlines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 409 (1985); EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 230–31
(1983).
56. Harper, Doctrinal Impediments, supra note 47, at 762.
57. Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610 (1993).
58. See, e.g., SARGEANT, AGE DISCRIMINATION, supra note 32, at 14, 24 (describing the U.S.
as “a pioneer in introducing legislation against age discrimination” and discussing the Wirtz
Report).
59. See generally id. at 2–4 (discussing stereotyping and noting that reducing it requires
making discrimination unlawful).
60. See generally 2010 Comprehensive Overview, supra note 34, ¶¶ 72, 75, 99 (discussing
ageist stereotypes and negative views of older persons, and noting that “age is a prohibited
ground of discrimination” in the context of “discrimination against unemployed older persons in
finding work”).
61. While social scientific understanding of age bias has advanced, the literature in this area is
less developed than the social scientific research on race, ethnicity, and gender. Wiener & Keller,
supra note 35, at 2. Indeed, there is robust legal literature on the role of implicit bias, or
unconscious prejudice, in employment decision-making and the way in which employment
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B. Stereotyping
There is great evidence that negative age stereotyping exists. A
stereotype is a generalization about a group that assumes all members
exhibit certain traits or behavioral characteristics. 62 The assumption
that all group members share traits and characteristics, when in fact one
finds individual variance within a group, makes stereotypes
inaccurate. 63 Although erroneous, negative, age-based stereotypes are
triggered automatically and operate unconsciously, potentially
“influenc[ing] conscious thought, behavior, and feelings toward older
people.” 64
While it is unclear the extent to which negative age stereotypes are
operative in the workplace and affect employment decision-making,
Professors Scott Adams and David Neumark note that several insights
emerge from studies conducted by industrial psychologists and
gerontologists. We know, for example, that managers and coworkers
draw on many older worker stereotypes in rating job applicants. 65
Whether age-related constructs ultimately play a part in hiring decisions
is less certain because the results of the studies are mixed. 66 Some
studies “find no significant effect of age in selection decisions,” 67 while
other studies “find evidence that younger applicants are treated more
favorably than older applicants.” 68
Studies also reveal the use of stereotypes in decision-making outside
of hiring. One study, for example, found that “managers perceive older
workers as less flexible and more resistant to change.” 69 This study

discrimination law fails to adequately account for this social psychological phenomenon. Most of
this legal literature focuses on race and sex bias. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, Implicit Bias,
“Science,” and Anti-Discrimination Law, 1 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 477, 477–78 (2007)
(discussing the prevalence of unconscious bias based on race and gender); Linda Hamilton
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination Law: Implicit Bias
and Disparate Treatment, 94 CAL. L. REV. 997, 1056–58 (2006) (explaining that implicit
stereotypes may result in discrimination); Nancy Levit, Changing Workforce Demographics and
the Future of the Protected Class Approach, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 463, 489 (2012)
(discussing unconscious racial prejudice).
62. Nelson, supra note 41, at 37.
63. Id. at 37–38.
64. Id. at 43.
65. Scott J. Adams & David Neumark, Age Discrimination in U.S. Labor Markets: A Review
of the Evidence, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 187, 189 (William M.
Rodgers III ed., 2006).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 189–90 (summarizing findings of Benson Rosen & Thomas J. Jerdee, Too Old or
Not Too Old?, 55 (6) HARV. BUS. REV. 97, 97–106 (1977)).
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also found managers less willing to support training and career
development for older workers, and less likely to offer promotion
opportunities to older workers for “jobs requiring flexibility, creativity,
and high motivation.” 70
Stereotyping may interact with other decision-making factors in
complex ways. It may be that certain jobs are coded as “youth jobs”
and more likely to be perceived as a poor fit for older workers. 71
Moreover, managers may be more likely to rely on stereotypes when
they are preoccupied or busy with matters other than the decision at
hand. Hence, age-biased decisions may be produced by statistical
discrimination—managers using age as an arbitrary criterion due to the
lack of time to obtain more individualized information about
candidates. 72 In such cases, it is not animus driving decisions but
merely “cognitive busyness” that results in bias against older workers. 73
This complexity helps explain why, although there may be evidence
linking age bias and adverse employment outcomes, some studies “have
difficulty ruling out alternative explanations.” 74 One might imagine, as
will be discussed further below, that legal concepts such as “but for”
causation might be ill-suited to untangling the complexities of decisionmaking involving older workers.
Even so, it is clear that negative stereotypes about older adults—for
example, that they suffer physical and mental decline, lack ambition,
fear technology, and are resistant to change—are prevalent in society,
deemed socially acceptable, and often internalized by older people
themselves. 75 These perceptions are institutionalized in numerous
ways: comic birthday greeting cards, television programming depicting
older people in stereotypic ways, and advertising that characterizes
many ordinary physical changes associated with aging, such as graying
hair and wrinkling skin, as treatable maladies. 76 The money spent on
70. Id. at 190.
71. Id. See Statement of Michael Campion, Professor of Mgmt., Purdue Univ., before the
U.S. EEOC 1 (July 15, 2009) (“[T]here are perceptions that certain jobs should be held by
workers of certain ages, and that age stereotypes are more influential when this perception does
not match the candidate’s (or incumbent’s) age.”).
72. Adams & Neumark, supra note 65, at 190.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 206.
75. See EVE M. BRANK, DISABILITY AND AGING DISCRIMINATION: PERSPECTIVES IN LAW
AND PSYCHOLOGY 99–101 (Richard L. Weiner & Steven L. Willborn eds., 2011) (noting that
older workers may feel less deserving than others due to their age and may internalize ageist
stereotypes that affect performance); JONATHAN HERRING, OLDER PEOPLE IN LAW AND SOCIETY
14 (2009) (“Fear of meeting ageist attitudes can affect the way older people behave and what they
do. It also affects older people’s attitudes about themselves.”).
76. Nelson, supra note 41, at 40–41.
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masking physical aging—whether through plastic surgery, Botox
treatments, hair dying, or teeth whitening—evidences society’s view
that aging is a negative phenomenon. 77 These perceptions have realworld implications.
In fact, surveys indicate that age discrimination is perceived as a
significant societal problem. In the U.S., for example, a 2007 survey
showed that 60% of the workforce ages 45 to 74 believed that workers
face age discrimination in the workplace. 78 Of those, 45% rated age
discrimination as very common while 49% rated it as somewhat
common. 79 Thirteen percent of the older workers surveyed reported
that they were discriminated against within the past five years under
several types of circumstances, such as failing to be hired, losing out on
a promotion, facing layoff or discharge, being denied training, or being
denied a pay raise. 80 Variation among those reporting discrimination
tracked employment status, income, and education level. Respondents
who were unemployed were three times as likely as those employed to
report experiencing discrimination. 81 Those with lower household
income were more likely than those with higher household income to
report experiences of age bias. 82 Of note, workers with less education
were less likely to report experiences of age discrimination than those
with a college or post-graduate degree. 83
In the EU, a 2009 survey of thirty countries (the twenty-seven EU
member countries, plus Croatia, Macedonia, and Turkey) found that
58% of respondents believed that age discrimination was widespread,
while 37% thought that it was rare. 84 The survey also found that there
was a difference in perception according to age, with those ages 40 and
over more likely to find age discrimination widespread. 85
A more recent study in the U.K. concluded that age discrimination

77. Id. at 41; BRANK, supra note 75, at 98.
78. AARP, STAYING AHEAD OF THE CURVE 2007: THE AARP WORK AND CAREER STUDY 68
(2008). This finding represented a decline from the AARP’s 2002 survey results, which reported
that over two-thirds of older workers believed age discrimination was operating in the workplace.
Id. Authors of the 2007 survey posited that “the more robust economy in 2007 might at least
partly account for the more favorable shift.” Id. Given that unemployment for older workers rose
to historic highs during the 2008 global economic crisis and its aftermath, one might wonder
whether perceptions among older workers have changed for the worse.
79. Id. at 69.
80. Id. at 73.
81. Id. at 78.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. EUROPEAN COMM’N, DISCRIMINATION IN THE EU IN 2009, at 10 (2009).
85. Id. at 11.
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and stereotyping continue to be rooted in British society, representing a
problem for both old and young. 86 The 2012 research found that 79%
of respondents perceived age discrimination as serious. 87 There were
no differences between men and women in their responses, with about
33% reporting that they had experienced some age discrimination in the
last year. 88 Interestingly, younger age groups were more likely to report
age discrimination as being serious compared to older age groups. 89
Those under the age of 25 years were at least twice as likely to report
having experienced age prejudice when compared to any other age
group. 90
Like the U.S. study, the U.K. study found a correlation between the
employment status of individuals and those individuals’ experience of
age prejudice. According to the research, respondents who were
employed full time and/or who were self-employed were less likely to
have experienced prejudice compared with the non-employed or those
employed only part-time. More specifically, “less than one-third (30
per cent) of respondents who were employed full-time said that they had
experienced prejudice compared to over half (50 per cent) of
respondents who were not employed.” 91 This finding is intuitive,
especially regarding older workers, since that group is more likely than
younger workers to fall victim to long-term unemployment. Although
less likely to lose their jobs, older workers have greater difficulty than
their younger counterparts in finding replacement employment.
Notably, the 2012 report, which compared perceptions about people
in their 20s with those in their 70s, found younger people subject to
negative stereotypes. 92 People viewed those over 70 years old as more

86. DANIEL SWEIRY & MAXINE WILLITTS, DEP’T FOR WORK & PENSIONS, ATTITUDES TO
AGE IN BRITAIN 2010/11, at 13 (2012), available at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/ih20112012/ihr7.pdf.
87. Id. at 26.
88. Id. at 35–36.
89. Id. at 26–27.
90. Id. at 38. We express some concern about this survey finding, wondering, without being
able to prove so empirically, whether young people’s views are colored by the very high level of
youth unemployment in the U.K. The disadvantage they suffer may be much more complex than
a simple manifestation of age discrimination. Their disadvantage, for example, certainly reflects
weak economic growth in the U.K. But perhaps young people read the inability of the economy
to generate sufficient jobs for them as discrimination against the young.
91. Id.
92. One potential source of stereotypical attitudes stems from a lack of contact with young
people. One survey found that when employers were asked about their assessment of the skills of
young men living in the district of their company, there was a marked difference between those
who employed young people and those that did not. For example, when asked about basic work
discipline, 76% of those who employed young people thought the discipline of young men was

4_BISOMRAPP

2013]

3/9/2013 1:34 PM

Age Discrimination Law in the U.K. and U.S.

731

friendly, more competent, and having higher moral standards than
people in their 20s. 93 These results reflect some hostility towards
younger people (based upon age stereotypes). 94 The results are also at
odds with a 2009 survey, which found a “clear stereotype that younger
people are viewed as more capable” than their older counterparts. 95
The 2009 survey concluded that “people over 70 were stereotyped as
warm but incompetent.” 96 The 2012 survey, however, found younger
people had an advantage over older people in terms of perceived
acceptability as a boss. 97 When comparing their reaction to having a
30-year-old boss versus a 70-year-old boss, most respondents found
both scenarios acceptable. 98 However, three times as many respondents
deemed having a 70-year-old boss “unacceptable” compared with those
who deemed having a 30-year-old boss “unacceptable.” 99
In sum, the U.K. and the U.S. share a common problem—the
continuing existence of negative, age-based stereotypes. There is
evidence that these stereotypes operate in the workplace, to the
disadvantage of older workers, and, in the U.K. and perhaps in the U.S.,
to that of younger workers as well. 100 Additionally, in both countries,
law is a chosen tool for combating the problem of age discrimination.
In Part II below, this Article compares those tools—doctrinal law in
both the U.K. and the U.S.—and reveals that both countries provide
inferior protection against age discrimination in comparison to other
good or reasonable, as compared with some 35% of those who did not employ young people. See
Angela Canny, What Employers Want and What Employers Do: Cumbrian Employers’
Recruitment, Assessment and Provision of Education/Learning Opportunities for Their Young
Workers, 17 J. EDUC. & WORK 495, 508 (2004).
93. SWEIRY & WILLITTS, supra note 86, at 46.
94. Research on age bias against the young is sparse in the U.S. Adams & Neumark, supra
note 65, at 200. This may be because at the federal level, the law only protects those aged 40 and
older. Moreover, even within the protected age category, favorable treatment of older workers
vis-à-vis their younger counterparts is not actionable. Id. One U.S. study found, however, that
perceived age bias does not harm the psychological well-being of young adults, in part due to a
perception that they will eventually experience upward social mobility as their chronological age
increases. This finding contrasted with the perceptions of older adults, for whom age
discrimination affected psychological well-being and group identification. Teri A. Garstka et al.,
How Young and Older Adults Differ in Their Responses to Perceived Age Discrimination, 19
PSYCHOL. & AGING 326, 331 (2004).
95. DOMINIC ABRAMS, TIINA EILOLA & HANNAH SWIFT, DEP’T FOR WORK & PENSIONS,
ATTITUDES TO AGE IN BRITAIN 2004–08, at 71 (2009).
96. Id. at 72.
97. SWEIRY & WILLETTS, supra note 86, at 70.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 72.
100. There is some indication that negative age-based stereotypes disadvantage younger U.S.
employees, though empirical research and surveys on the subject are sparse. See supra note 90
and accompanying text.
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forms of prohibited workplace bias. While inferior legal protection is
conceptualized somewhat differently in each country, it is the incursion
of an economic imperative that weakens age discrimination law in both
cases.
II.

DIVERGING LEGAL DOCTRINE: COMPARING AGE DISCRIMINATION
LAW IN THE U.K. AND U.S.

A. Age Discrimination Law in the U.K.
The “problem” of the ageing population in the U.K. is hardly new.
The birth rate actually started to decline in the late nineteenth
century. 101 This decline was accompanied by an increase in the life
span of older adults. The proportion of men over age 65 and women
over age 60 to the general population, for example, was 6.2% in 1901,
9.6% in 1931, 12% in 1941, and 13.5% in 1951. 102 Policy debate
initially focused on the declining birth rate rather than the increasing
numbers of older people. The latter slowly became an issue prior to and
after World War II—as evidenced in 1942, for example, with the
publication of a report by the Inter-Departmental Committee on Social
Insurance and Allied Services, chaired by Sir William Beveridge
(“Beveridge Report”). 103
The Beveridge Report surveyed the state of pensions and insurance
provisions at the time, and made detailed recommendations for the
future. In its analysis of the “problem of age,” the Report stated that
there were two particular issues. 104 The first issue, as reflected in the
debate leading up to the adoption of the Employment Equality Age
Regulations in 2006, 105 was the increasing number of pensioners in
relation to the numbers of young people and those working. The second
issue was that the consequences of retirement and old age were not
uniform in all cases—for example, poverty affected some but not
others.
Today, the proportion of older people in the population continues to
increase. By 1990, those over the age of 65 years in the U.K.

101. Michael Anderson, The Social Implications of Demographic Change, in 2 THE
CAMBRIDGE SOCIAL HISTORY OF BRITAIN 1750–1950, at 1, 1 (Francis Michael Longstreth
Thompson ed., 1993); SIMON SZRETER, FERTILITY, CLASS AND GENDER IN BRITAIN 1860–1940,
at 1 (1996).
102. PAT THANE, OLD AGE IN ENGLISH HISTORY 333 (2000).
103. See SIR WILLIAM BEVERIDGE, SOCIAL INSURANCE AND ALLIED SERVICES 5–20 (1942)
(introducing and summarizing the Beveridge Report).
104. Id. at 90–101 (discussing the “problem of age”).
105. Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1031.
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constituted 15.7% of the population. In 2010, this figure had reached
16.5%. 106 This is a problem throughout the EU, where the number and
proportion of older people is expected to increase for the foreseeable
future. 107
Despite recognizing the issue of an ageing population, successive
U.K. governments declined to take any regulatory action with respect to
age discrimination. On numerous occasions prior to 2006, members of
Parliament attempted to introduce modest measures against age
discrimination in recruitment advertising. All of these measures were
opposed by the government of the day, and all were, therefore,
unsuccessful. 108 Eventually, in November 1998, the government
introduced a voluntary Code of Practice on Age Diversity in
Employment, which subsequent evaluations recognized as being
unsuccessful. 109 Only one in three companies, for example, was aware
of the Code of Practice, but, of these, only 23% had actually seen a
copy. 110 More alarmingly, only 8% of companies expected to make
changes as a result of the Code of Practice. 111 The surveys
accompanying the evaluation revealed the stereotypical views held by
many employers. 112
Employers were asked whether “specified
106. Population Age Structure by Major Age Groups, 1990 and 2010, EUROSTAT,
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:Population_age_structur
e_by_major_age_groups,_1990_and_2010_(%25_of_the_total_population).png&filetimestamp=2
0111130143501 (last visited Oct. 17, 2012). Interestingly, the figures for the EU27 are even
more dramatic, with the proportion of those over 65 years increasing from 13.7% in 1990 to
17.4% in 2010. Id.
107. See Commission Green Paper, Confronting Demographic Change: A New Solidarity
between the Generations, COM (2005) 94 final (not published in the Official Journal) (predicting
that there will be a 37.4% increase in the proportion of old people between 2010 and 2030).
108. These measures included proposed bills by Ms. Linda Perham MP in 1998, David
Winnick MP in 1990 and 1996, Gwynneth Dunwoody MP in 1992, Baroness Phillips in 1989 (in
the House of Lords), Barry Field MP in 1989, and Ann Clwyd MP in 1985. See generally JULIA
LOURIE, EMPLOYMENT (UPPER AGE LIMITS IN ADVERTISEMENTS) BILL, HOUSE OF COMMONS
RESEARCH PAPER 96/19, at 10 (Jan. 31, 1996), available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefingpapers/RP96-19 (listing the most recent bills banning discrimination on age grounds, none of
which have made much progress).
109. See DEBORAH JONES, DEP’T FOR EDUC. & EMP., EVALUATION OF THE CODE OF
PRACTICE ON AGE DIVERSITY IN EMPLOYMENT: INTERIM SUMMARY OF RESULTS (June 2000)
[hereinafter INTERIM SUMMARY], available at https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/RSG/
publicationDetail/Page1/RBX6/00. See also DEP’T FOR WORK AND PENSIONS, EVALUATION OF
THE CODE OF PRACTICE ON AGE DIVERSITY IN EMPLOYMENT: FINAL REPORT 24–25 (Oct. 2001)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT], available at https://www.education.gov.uk/publications/RSG/
publicationDetail/Page1/RBX21-01 (concluding that The Code is not likely to be successful on its
own).
110. FINAL REPORT, supra note 109, at 22. Not surprisingly, awareness was much higher in
large companies, where almost two-thirds knew about the Code of Practice. Id.
111. Id. at 23.
112. INTERIM SUMMARY, supra note 109, at 5 (“[S]tereotypical images of older and younger
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attributes applied to older or younger workers, to both, or to neither.
Stability, maturity, reliability, work commitment, and good managerial
skills were the most frequently stated attributes of older workers, while
ambition, IT skills, creativity, and a willingness to relocate were the
most frequent attributes of younger workers.” 113
Regulation of age discrimination in employment finally came to the
U.K. as a result of the EU’s Equal Treatment Directive adopted in
2000. 114 It is doubtful that laws prohibiting age discrimination would
have been enacted in the U.K. without this Directive. Indeed, the
previous record of governments of both of the major political parties
suggests that legislation would have been unlikely. The Directive was
finally transposed into British law in October 2006 in the Employment
Equality (Age) Regulations 2006. 115 As noted below, the weakness of
the legislation in the U.K., and indeed of the Directive itself, is the wide
latitude given for justifying exceptions. This breadth has the effect of
making it more possible to objectively justify discrimination than
measures tackling discrimination on different grounds. 116 Hence, one
may view the U.K.’s embrace of age discrimination law as not only
recent, but also somewhat reluctant.
B. Age Discrimination Law in the U.S.
In contrast, U.S. regulation against age discrimination has been on
the books for over forty years. The possible prohibition of age
discrimination was first raised during the debates over Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), the landmark American civil rights
statute that bans employment discrimination based on race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex. 117 Although age was not included as
a protected characteristic under Title VII, Congress did ask the
Secretary of Labor to study the issue, ascertain its nature and extent, and
recommend possible solutions. 118 The Secretary’s subsequent report,

workers were reinforced by the responses to a pre-coded list of specified attributes.”).
113. Id.
114. Council Directive 2000/78, Establishing a General Framework for Equal Treatment in
Employment and Occupation, 2000 O.J. (L 303) 16 (EC).
115. Employment Equality (Age) Regulations, supra note 105. These regulations, with the
exception of Schedule 6, were incorporated into the Equality Act 2010, c.15, effective October
2010. The provisions of Schedule 6 concerning the procedures for enforcing the default
retirement age of 65 years of age were abolished in 2011.
116. The Equality Act of 2010 referred to grounds of protection as “protected characteristics.”
The Act contains nine of these, but age, for example, is the only protected characteristic which
allows justification for direct discrimination. See Equality Act, 2010, ch. 15, § 13(2) (U.K.).
117. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2000e17 (2006).
118. Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act at Thirty: Where It’s Been,
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the Wirtz Report, 119 found that age bias in the workplace was a
significant phenomenon meriting legal prohibition. The Report,
however, found that this form of discrimination was less malicious and
destructive than, for example, bias based on other Title VII-protected
characteristics like race and religion. 120 For aging workers, the problem
was not hostility but unsupported assumptions about aging and
ability. 121
In 1967, Congress enacted the ADEA, which bans employers from
discriminating against employees “because of such individual’s age.” 122
Little debate preceded the enactment of the statute; legislative action to
prohibit age discrimination garnered broad political support. 123 Thus,
original Congressional support for age discrimination legislation was
well-established and fairly wholehearted. 124
Notwithstanding this broad-based support, the ADEA is often
characterized as combating a lesser or different evil than those set forth
in other employment discrimination laws. Commentators have noted
that those people protected by the ADEA do not comprise a discrete and
insular minority with immutable characteristics. 125 Rather, the group
protected by age discrimination legislation is “an ever changing cohort

Where It is Today, Where It’s Going, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 579, 581 (1997).
119. See supra Part I.A.
120. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 5–7.
121. See id. at 7 (noting that employers often set upper age limits based on preconceptions
rather than relevant experience).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006).
123. Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age Discrimination Really Age
Discrimination?: The ADEA’s Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 785 (1997).
124. Support for the Older Worker Benefit Protection Act in 1990 was similarly bipartisan
and broad. Indeed, Congress passed the Act close to unanimously. Michael C. Harper, AgeBased Exit Incentives, Coercion, and the Prospective Waiver of ADEA Rights: The Failure of the
Older Worker Benefits Protection Act, 79 VA. L. REV. 1271, 1272 (1993) [hereinafter Harper,
Age-Based Exit Incentives].
125. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 123, at 781 (“Far from being discrete and insular, the
elderly represent the normal unfolding of life’s processes for all persons.”). Age is an extremely
complicated category and one of the most complicating factors is intersectionality. Aging
produces different effects for different discrete and insular subgroups, as is undeniably evident in
the U.S. (for example, during the global economic crisis and its aftermath). The recession
produced greater unemployment for racial and ethnic minority older workers, those with limited
education, and men. Bisom-Rapp, Frazer & Sargeant, Decent Work, Older Workers, supra note
4, at 98–99. See generally Lynn Roseberry, Multiple Discrimination, in AGE DISCRIMINATION
AND DIVERSITY 16 (Malcolm Sargeant ed., 2011) (discussing the concept of multiple
discrimination based on age and other protected characteristics). We do not assert that age is
fully comparable with immutable characteristics such as race. But we argue that it should not be
a second-class protected category—a type of bias prohibited by law on paper and yet a protection
exceedingly difficult to invoke in practice.
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of older workers.” 126 Additionally, as in the U.K., in comparison with
legal prohibition on other grounds, the ADEA is subject to “an
unprecedented number of exceptions.” 127
The rationale for protecting older workers is frequently made by U.S.
legal academics in economic terms—specifically, in terms of the lifecycle model of career employment. 128 Under the life-cycle theory,
Professor George Rutherglen notes,
[A]n employee’s compensation at first exceeds his productivity
because the employee receives on-the-job training from the employer.
Although an employee’s compensation gradually increases with
seniority and with promotions, productivity increases even faster. At
some point, the employee’s productivity exceeds his compensation, so
that the employer profits from the training that it has given to the
employee. As the employee grows old, however, his productivity
again sinks below his compensation. According to the life cycle
theory of earnings, the employer’s profits during the middle period
should compensate it for its losses in the earlier and later periods. 129

The ADEA aims to protect against opportunistic employer conduct
that deprives older workers of deferred compensation at the end of their
careers, when their productivity is supposedly below their
compensation. 130 Taking this phenomenon at face value, American
scholars have trained their sights on ways in which, in economic terms,
the law falls short of that goal. 131

126. GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY IN
THEORY AND DOCTRINE 205 (2007) [hereinafter RUTHERGLEN, VISIONS OF EQUALITY].
127. George Rutherglen, From Race to Age: The Expanding Scope of Employment
Discrimination Law, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 491, 495 (1995) [hereinafter Rutherglen, From Race to
Age] (“[The ADEA] established the first federal prohibition against discrimination based on age
but also subjected this prohibition to an unprecedented number of exceptions.”).
128. See generally Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 11 (1993) (analyzing whether courts should find an
employee is at will or protected by just cause).
129. Rutherglen, From Race to Age, supra note 127, at 500. The ADEA’s enforcement
procedures are modeled on the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 496. See also Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 215–18, 251–61 (2006).
130. RUTHERGLEN, VISIONS OF EQUALITY, supra note 126, at 206 (“On the life-cycle theory
of earnings, if an employer opportunistically discharges an employee late in his career, the
discharge effectively deprives the employee of the postponed compensation for the middle period
of his career when his productivity exceeded his pay. Laws against age discrimination are one
means of preventing employers from taking advantage of their employees in this way.”)
131. See, e.g., Gary Minda, Opportunistic Downsizing of Aging Workers: The 1990s Version
of Age and Pension Discrimination in Employment, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 511, 540–47 (1997)
(explaining why the ADEA is ill-suited to prevent opportunistic downsizing of aging workers).
But see Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 123, at 787–92 (arguing that in drafting the ADEA and
its amendments, Congress insufficiently understood the life-cycle model and the vulnerability of
late career employees).
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Although modeled after Title VII, 132 over time, and due in part to an
incomplete reform of Title VII by Congress in 1991, 133 the U.S.
Supreme Court has dismantled a unified approach to employment
discrimination law doctrine in favor of an approach that considers legal
rules applying to age discrimination as less prominent and less
important than rules covering other forms of discrimination. 134 In the
U.S., age discrimination law rules are harder for plaintiffs to
operationalize than is the legal doctrine applicable to race, color,
religion, national origin, and sex. 135
The discussion below evaluates divergent legal doctrine in the U.K.
and the U.S. More specifically, these Subsections discern how the law
in each country falls short of achieving a central goal of age
discrimination legislation—the elimination of negative, age-based
stereotypes in the workplace—while privileging employers’ economic
incentives to displace more highly compensated older workers. In the
U.K., the law’s weakness turns on the number of potential grounds for
justification. That is, given the law’s very generally stated definition of
justification, there are many possible exceptions to the principle of
equal treatment on the basis of age—one of the most notable being the
possibility of employer-justified compulsory retirement. In the U.S., the
shortfall is more complicated, and turns on several factors: (1) an underinclusive protected class; (2) a narrow, cramped interpretation of the
principal evil the ADEA is designed to address; and (3) doctrinal
requirements that weaken the ability of plaintiffs to make out a prima
facie case of age discrimination and strengthen the ability of defendant
employers to defend against suit.
132. Issacharoff & Harris, supra note 123, at 785. The ADEA’s remedies are modeled on the
Fair Labor Standards Act. See RUTHERGLEN, VISIONS OF EQUALITY, supra note 126, at 215
(“[T]he ADEA borrows most of the remedial provisions of the FLSA.”).
133. More specifically, Congress addressed mixed motive claims in Title VII cases when it
amended that statute in 1991. Congress did not, however, simultaneously amend the ADEA.
This has led the Supreme Court to construe Congress’s inaction as disapproval of mixed motive
claims in age discrimination cases. Michael Foreman, Gross v. FBL Financial Services—Oh So
Gross!, 40 U. MEM. L. REV. 681, 687 (2010).
134. William R. Corbett, Babbling about Employment Discrimination Law: Does the Master
Builder Understand the Blueprint for the Great Tower?, 12 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 683, 688 (2010)
(“[N]ot only is the Court requiring different structures for the ADEA and Title VII, but Gross is
also the latest in a series of cases instructing that the ADEA portion of the tower is to be far less
prominent than its Title VII counterpart.”).
135. See id. at 708–19 (describing the Court’s asymmetrical application of disparate
treatment, disparate impact, and reverse discrimination theories in ADEA litigation, as compared
with Title VII litigation). See also Carla J. Rozycki & Emma J. Sullivan, Employees Bringing
Disparate-Impact Claims under the ADEA Continue to Face an Uphill Battle despite the Supreme
Court’s Decisions in Smith v. City of Jackson and Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,
26 A.B.A. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 1, 8–9 (2010).
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Section C examines the class protected by age discrimination in each
country, while Section D evaluates a central weakness of the U.K.’s age
discrimination law—the provision for objective justification—which is
derived from the EU’s Equal Treatment Directive. Subsection E then
covers two key shortfalls of the U.S. system: the stingy interpretation of
the ADEA’s purpose and the doctrinal changes antithetical to plaintiffs’
interests and beneficial to defendants.
C. A Case of Divergence: The Protected Class
1. The Protected Class in the U.K.
A significant difference between the U.K. and the U.S. is the size of
the protected class. In the U.K., age discrimination legislation applies
to all persons in the labor market (i.e., persons, normally 16 years and
above, who are working or seeking work). Prior to 2006, workers who
had reached the normal retirement age were deprived of some
employment protections, such as the right to claim unfair dismissal and
the right to redundancy (severance) payments. 136 The 2006 regulations
introduced a default retirement age of 65, but this benchmark was
subsequently abolished in 2011. 137
Since the adoption of age regulations in 2006, the U.K. has not had a
lower age limit for employment protection (as there is in the U.S.). This
is important because ample evidence suggests that young people suffer
from age discrimination, albeit with perhaps less severe consequences
than with older people. 138 One analysis, for example, looked at the 16to 19-year-old age group and those individuals’ reasons for leaving their

136. See Employment Rights Act 1996, ch. 18, §(§) 109, 156 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/enacted (establishing a right to claim unfair
dismissal and right to severance payments).
137. See infra note 204 and accompanying text.
138. AGE POSITIVE, DEP’T. FOR WORK & PENSIONS, AGEISM: ATTITUDES AND EXPERIENCES
OF YOUNG PEOPLE (2001), available at http://research.dwp.gov.uk/asd/asd5/rports20052006/agepos13.pdf. This survey found that the main types of age-related behavior that younger
people experience were: age limits on job applications; younger people being treated differently
from other (older) staff; talking (down) to younger people in a patronizing fashion and tone of
voice; not appointing younger people because they are too young; not appointing younger people
because they are too old; refusing access to training on grounds of age; making junior staff do all
the menial tasks; “rites of passage” involving teasing and bullying; paying younger staff less than
others who are doing equivalent work; excluding young people from pension arrangements; and
restricting redundancy payments to years of employment after the age of 18. We distinguish
many of the listed types of conduct from forms of age discrimination against younger people that
are not controversial even if young people view the rules as unfair. For example, most states in
the U.S. bar young people from obtaining a driver’s license, typically until they are at least 16.
Eglit, Age Bias, supra note 45, at 100. Yet such limitations are beneficial safety restrictions and
thus, we believe, fully justifiable. Id.
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last job. 139 Thirty-six percent of the group surveyed stated that they had
voluntarily resigned. In contrast, the same analysis, when looking at
why people in their 50s left their last job, found that only 8% had
resigned voluntarily. 140
Whatever the actual reason for these
resignations, the difference is perhaps explained by the confidence that
young people have in finding alternative work, whereas for people in
their 50s, leaving a job can often mean leaving the workforce altogether.
The consequences of protecting the U.K.’s younger population from
age discrimination is exemplified in Wilkinson v. Springwell
Engineering, where an 18-year-old claimant was awarded £16,000
compensation for being subject to age discrimination. 141 The claimant,
who was hired by a small engineering company in January 2007 to
replace her aunt (who was a much older worker), was terminated in
March of the same year. The Tribunal found that the employer adopted
stereotypical assumptions regarding the relationship between
experience, capability, and age on the one hand, and lack of experience,
incapability, and youth on the other. 142 The claimant stated that she had
been told that her employment was being terminated on the grounds that
she was too young for the job. The Tribunal accepted her version of the
events and awarded compensation, which included a sum of £5000 for
injury to feelings.
There have also been other cases at the European Court of Justice
(“CJEU”) regarding employment policies that weakened the
employment rights of young people in order to improve their
employability (i.e., in the hopes of making them more attractive to
employers). In Kücükdeveci v. Swedex, a reference from the German
court, Swedex dismissed a 28-year-old employee after ten years of
service. However, a rule had existed that—for the purposes of
calculating the notice period—allowed the employer to ignore all
service before the age of 25 years. 143 Similarly, in Hütter v. Technische
Universität Graz, a reference from the Austrian court, there had existed
a rule concerning an incremental scale of pay for civil servants based on

139. EMPLOYERS FORUM ON AGE, AGE AT WORK (2005), available at http://www.efa.org.
uk/publications.php?action=search&category=19.
140. Id. at 45.
141. L. Wilkinson v Springwell Eng’g Ltd., Case Number 2570420/07, Newcastle
Employment Tribunal (Oct. 11, 2007), 3, available at http://employment.practicallaw.com/0-3809782 (last visited Dec. 2, 2012).
142. Id. at 10.
143. Case C-555/07, Kücükdeveci v. Swedex GmbH & Co. KG, 2 C.M.L.R. 33, ¶¶ 13–15
(2010).
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their length of employment. 144 Employment before the age of 18 years,
however, did not count towards this pay scheme. In both cases, the
claimants alleged that they were subjected to age discrimination. The
CJEU upheld their complaints despite the good intentions of those who
adopted the rules in order to help young people into employment. Thus,
the European approach to age discrimination is broad and recognizes
that assumptions about age not only adversely affect middle-aged and
older workers, but also employees near the beginning of their working
lives.
2. The Protected Class in the U.S.
In the U.S., the protected class is narrowly defined, and the type of
age bias prohibited is more unitary. As originally enacted, the ADEA
protected only those between the ages of 40 and 65—employees
deemed middle-aged through what was then seen as retirement age.145
In 1978, Congress increased the ceiling to age 70, but in 1986 removed
the ceiling for most workers. 146 At present, the protected class under
the ADEA is comprised of individuals aged 40 and above. Narrowly
defining the protected class—those 40 years of age and over—is in
accord with one of the main purposes of the Act: “to promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age.” 147
Yet, even within the defined class, protection runs in one direction:
towards older employees. In General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v.
Cline, 148 the employer and union agreed to eliminate retiree health
benefits for those presently employed but subsequently retired, except
for “then current workers at least 50 years old.” 149 Current employees
ages 40 to 49 sued, claiming that the provision of the collective
bargaining agreement discriminated against them on the basis of age. 150
Referencing the Senate and House hearings that preceded the votes on
the ADEA, and interpreting the ADEA’s preamble, the Supreme Court
held that Congress, when enacting the statute, was moved by the plight
of older workers vis-à-vis their younger counterparts, but not vice

144. Case C-88/08, David Hütter v. Technische Universität Graz, 2009 E.C.R. I-05325, ¶¶ 7,
14.
145. See generally D. Aaron Lacy, You Are Not Quite as Old as You Think: Making the Case
for Reverse Age Discrimination under the ADEA, 26 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 363, 368
(2005).
146. Id. at 368–69.
147. 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (2006).
148. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
149. Id. at 584.
150. Id. at 585.
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versa. 151 Writing for the Court’s majority, Justice Souter noted that
Congress’s findings and statements of purpose reveal that the adverse
effects of aging increase over time and that the legislators’ concern was
for the disadvantaged condition of older workers relative to their
younger counterparts. 152 Moreover, on the basis of “common sense,”
the Court categorically rejected the possibility that younger workers
suffer at the their elders’ expense. 153
Reference to “age
discrimination,” claimed Justice Souter, is “naturally understood to refer
to discrimination against the older.” 154 Thus, reverse discrimination
suits by younger workers within the protected class are not cognizable.
Judicial “common sense” notwithstanding, discrimination against the
young does occur in the U.S., although the frequency of the
phenomenon is unclear. For example, a study published in 2011 by the
Business and Professional Women’s Foundation surveyed 662 women
born between the years 1978 and 1994. 155 Almost 50% of those
surveyed had observed or experienced gender bias; of these women,
51% reported generational discrimination based on youth. 156 This
result corroborated prior findings that young women, in particular,
suffer from age discrimination. 157 Anecdotal accounts also indicate
that, in tough economic times, workers in their 20s and 30s, who may
lawfully be singled out based on age, are at greater risk of layoff. 158
Such accounts are buttressed by the higher unemployment rate of
younger workers. 159 Additionally, there is some job competition
between workers ages 65 years old or over and 16- to 19-year-old
workers in industries such as food preparation and serving. 160 One
151. Id. at 588–90.
152. Id. at 590.
153. Id. at 591.
154. Id.
155. See BUS. & PROF’L WOMEN’S FOUND., FROM GEN Y WOMEN TO EMPLOYERS: WHAT
THEY WANT IN THE WORKPLACE AND WHY IT MATTERS FOR BUSINESS 5 (2011) (stating that the
purpose of the survey was to understand what women needed to be successful in the workplace).
156. Id. at 7.
157. See generally id. (noting that younger women are more likely than older women to be
subjected to age discrimination). One wonders whether some of the bias experienced by young
women is based on potential or actual pregnancy or caregiving responsibilities of younger
women. The study did not address this question.
158. See Dana Mattioli, With Jobs Scarce, Age Becomes an Issue: More Young Workers are at
Risk of Layoffs as Employers Grow Wary of Letting Older Employees Go, WALL ST. J., May 19,
2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124270050325833327.html (stating that employers are
attempting to circumvent age-discrimination lawsuits by adopting a “last one in, first one out”
policy as a means of conducting layoffs).
159. Id.
160. Michael McDonough & Andy Cinko, Elderly Workers Overtake Teens in Job Search:
Chart of the Day, BLOOMBERG (July 12, 2010), http://mobile.bloomberg.com/news/2010-07-
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might assume that these are jobs where stereotypes that disfavor the
young come into play.
What explains the divergence between the European and American
approaches to the class protection under age discrimination legislation?
One possible reason is the existence of a viable political movement on
one side of the Atlantic and the relative absence of such agitation on the
other. Young people in the EU—although perhaps not so much in the
U.K.—are willing to take to the streets to protest actions they perceive
as inimical to their interests in the labor market. 161 While the Occupy
Wall Street movement recently captured the imagination of many
youths in the U.S., 162 agitation by the young over age discrimination
simply has not existed. 163 Another possible reason is that, in the EU,
age was introduced as one of a number of protected characteristics in
the same piece of legislation. Hence, there is largely a uniform
approach to protection against discrimination (except for Article 6 of
the Equal Treatment Directive, 164 which will be explored below).
Regardless of the cause, failing to protect workers under 40 from age
discrimination, and restricting the protections available to those 40 and
up by prohibiting reverse discrimination suits, are deficiencies in U.S.
age discrimination law. These aspects of U.S. legislation limit the
efficacy of law as a tool to eradicate age stereotyping.
D. The U.K.’s Exceptions to the Rule: Objective Justification for
Differential Treatment Based on Age
As noted above, the EU’s Equal Treatment Directive was the impetus
for passing age discrimination regulations in the U.K. in 2006. 165 U.K.
12/u-s-workers-over-65-overtake-teens-for-first-time-since-48-chart-of-day.
161. See Joseph A. Seiner, Understanding the Unrest of France’s Younger Workers: The
Price of American Ambivalence, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1053, 1055 (2006) (stating that French youth
staged a series of violent protests based on the belief that they were being “used and tossed
aside”).
162. The Occupy Wall Street movement began in September 2011 in New York City’s
Zuccotti Park. Initially, about 1000 demonstrators occupied the park on a twenty-four-hour basis,
in order to demonstrate their outrage over the global economic crisis, “bank bailouts, high
unemployment, and the increasing income disparity between the highest earners and everyone
else.” Sarah Kunstler, The Right to Occupy—Occupy Wall Street and the First Amendment, 39
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 989, 990 (2012). The movement quickly spread to many other cities and
towns, with occupations in parks lasting days and weeks. Id. at 991–92. The protests inspired a
national conversation about the proper role of the government and rising income inequality. Id. at
990–92.
163. Seiner, supra note 161, at 1084, 1093–94.
164. Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 114, at art. 6.
165. See supra notes 103–07 and accompanying text (describing the events leading up to the
adoption of the Framework Directive on Equal Treatment in Employment and Occupation in the
EU).
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age discrimination law is influenced both by the Directive and by the
CJEU’s rulings on the age aspects of the Directive in regard to national
law. 166 The CJEU cases not only involve U.K. law, but also,
potentially, law in other EU member states. Accordingly, this Article
discusses cases that arose in countries other than the U.K. More
specifically, the Subsection below examines the Directive and the
CJEU’s seminal age discrimination case from Germany, Mangold v.
Helm. 167 The Subsection then turns to CJEU and U.K. case law
regarding compulsory retirement—the most significant, and to older
workers the most threatening, exception to the prohibition on age
discrimination.
1. The Equal Treatment Directive and Mangold
Colm O’Cinneide notes that the prohibition of age discrimination in
the Equal Treatment Directive was greeted with “a general (if vague)
welcome across the EU.” 168 Many assumed that the EU would embrace
a prohibition on age discrimination akin to that adopted in jurisdictions
such as the U.S. Moreover, age discrimination legislation was seen as a
way to both advance equality and human rights and promote the EU’s
Employment Strategy, especially the goal of increasing the labor market
participation of older people. 169 The Directive, however, prompted
many questions that have required judicial consideration to answer.
Article 1 of the Directive articulates the principle of equal treatment
on a number of grounds, including age. Equal treatment prohibits both
direct discrimination and indirect discrimination 170 on those grounds. 171
The Directive, however, provides EU member countries with a number
of broad exceptions to the equal treatment principle regarding age,
including the opportunity to justify direct and indirect discrimination in
certain cases. 172 Article 6 of the Directive, titled “justification of
differences of treatment on grounds of age,” provides that “differences
of treatment because of age will not constitute age discrimination if . . .

166. The CJEU has jurisdiction to issue preliminary rulings on the interpretation of EU law
when asked to do so by courts or judges of the Member States’ national courts. THE GLOBAL
WORKPLACE, supra note 7, at 395.
167. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981.
168. Colm O’Cinneide, Age Discrimination and the European Court of Justice: EU Equality
Law Comes of Age, 2 REVUE DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES 253 (2009–2010).
169. Id.
170. These types of discrimination are known as disparate treatment and disparate impact in
the U.S. See infra notes 196–97.
171. Malcolm Sargeant, The Default Retirement Age: Legitimate Aims and Disproportionate
Means, 39 INDUS. L.J. 244, 246 (2010) [hereinafter Sargeant, Disproportionate Means].
172. Id.
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they are objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim,
including legitimate employment policy, labour market and vocational
training objectives, and if the means of achieving that aim are
appropriate and necessary.” 173 Thus, justifying differential treatment
requires, first, identifying a legitimate aim or goal, and second,
demonstrating that the means by which the aim is pursued are
appropriate and necessary.
Article 6(1) then provides examples of justifiable differences in
treatment:
(a) the setting of special conditions on access to employment and
vocational training, employment and occupation, including dismissal
and remuneration conditions, for young people, older workers and
persons with caring responsibilities in order to promote their
vocational integration or ensure their protection;
(b) the fixing of minimum conditions of age, professional experience
or seniority in service for access to employment or to certain
advantages linked to employment;
(c) the fixing of a maximum age for recruitment which is based on the
training requirements of the post in question or the need for a
reasonable period of employment before retirement. 174

Despite these examples, the meaning of the term “legitimate aim”
remains unclear. While the aim must relate to legitimate employment
policy, the labor market, and vocational training objectives, this general
terminology leaves the ultimate boundaries of age discrimination
legislation to be determined by the courts.
Age discrimination is the only ground of discrimination in the
Directive that has a specified list of areas where discrimination may be
justified. Moreover, these broad exceptions potentially allow the
concerns of the labor market—an economic imperative—to trump the
right of workers to be free from age discrimination. 175 To the extent
such actions are justifiable, the civil or human rights of older workers
are deemed less significant than the supposed economic needs of greater
society.
Indeed, the CJEU has shown an alarming readiness to accept the
elimination of the rights of older workers as potentially justifiable, even
in cases representing advances in European age discrimination
jurisprudence. For example, the CJEU’s formative age discrimination
case, Mangold v. Helm, concerned an individual aged 56 years and

173. Council Directive 2000/78, supra note 114, at art. 6(1).
174. Id.
175. Sargeant, Disproportionate Means, supra note 171, at 247.
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employed on a fixed-term contract. 176 Under German law, indefinite
term contracts with good cause protection are ideal. Consequently, and
also due to an EU directive on fixed-term work, 177 German law places
two limitations on fixed-term employment contracts: (1) a requirement
that employers provide an objective reason justifying the term; or,
alternatively, (2) the imposition of limits on the number of contract
renewals (a maximum of three) and on total duration (a maximum of
two years). 178 In what might appear as a surprise to an American
reader, these restrictions, which were considered significant worker
protections, did not apply to contracts with older people. German law
permitted fixed-term contracts, even without the above restrictions, if
the employee was aged 60 or over. 179 Thus, older workers could be
kept in a perpetual state of limbo—living from contract to contract with
no hope of ever being given an indefinite term.
For middle-aged workers, that situation changed for the worse in
December 2000, when the Law on Part-Time Working and Fixed-Term
Contracts (“TzBfG”) was enacted. Paragraph 14(1) of the TzBfG
reenacted a general rule whereby a fixed-term contract must be based on
objective criteria. 180 Under paragraph 14(2), in the absence of an
objective reason, the maximum total duration of the contract is again
limited to two years, and, subject to that limit, up to three renewals. 181
However, according to paragraph 14(3) of the TzBfG, the “conclusion
of a fixed-term employment contract shall not require objective
justification if the worker has reached the age of 58 by the time the
fixed-term employment relationship begins.” 182
Mr. Mangold later claimed injury when the minimum age for the
removal of protection was lowered to 52 years. 183 In 2003, Mangold
entered into a fixed-term employment contract with Helm, a lawyer.
This contract expressly noted that the contract duration was based on
the statutory provision removing protection for older workers. The
litigants agreed “that there was no reason for the fixed term of this
contract” other than the fact that Mangold was more than 52 years old
and the statutory provision “ma[d]e it easier to conclude fixed-term

176. Case C-144/04, Mangold v. Helm, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981, ¶ 20.
177. Id. ¶¶ 3–5.
178. Id. ¶ 18.
179. See Beschäftigungsförderungsgesetz [Law to Promote Employment], Apr. 26, 1985,
BGBL. I, ¶ 1, amended Sept. 25, 1996.
180. Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981, ¶ 18.
181. Id.
182. Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
183. Id. ¶ 19.
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contracts . . . with older workers.” 184 Mangold challenged the German
statutory law as unjustified age discrimination. 185
According to the German government, the purpose of the legislation
was to help unemployed older workers find work, in light of the
difficulties this group typically encounters when seeking
employment. 186 The CJEU viewed the legitimacy of this economically
driven aim as unassailable. 187 As the Court noted, “An objective of that
kind must as a rule . . . be regarded as justifying, ‘objectively and
reasonably’ . . . a difference of treatment on grounds of age . . . .” 188
But the legislation ran afoul of the Equal Treatment Directive for a
different reason. The court held that the means of accomplishing the
aim were not appropriate and necessary because, inter alia, the result of
the measure was to effectively remove protection, with regard to fixedterm contracts, from all workers who reach age 52 and not just those
who were searching for work. 189 Thus, the court concluded on grounds
of proportionality that the measure conflicted with European
Community law. Yet the court’s acceptance of the economically based
argument—that in order to help unemployed older workers it is
permissible to provide them with lesser employment protections than
their younger counterparts—remains. The willingness to allow this
economic imperative to interfere with the principle of equal treatment is
clear, even in a case lauded by some and criticized by others for its
description of the age discrimination prohibition as a fundamental norm
of European law. 190
2. U.K. Age Discrimination Legislation, Justification, and
Compulsory Retirement
The U.K.’s Equality Act 2010 (the age provisions of which were
originally adopted in 2006) now contains the provisions necessary to
tackle age discrimination in employment. 191 Since then, there has been
a steady increase in complaints of age discrimination at employment
tribunals. For example, between 2010 and 2011, litigants filed 6800
complaints with employment tribunals on the grounds of age, an
increase of 5200 from the previous year and 3800 from the year before

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Id. ¶ 21.
O’Cinneide, supra note 168, at 261.
Mangold, 2005 E.C.R. I-9981, ¶ 59.
Id. at [60]–[61].
Id. at [61].
Id. at [64].
See O’Cinneide, supra note 168, at 261–62.
See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
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that. 192
The legislation, however, allows for some exceptions to the principle
of non-discrimination, including the possibility of objectively justifying
direct discrimination. 193 Schedule 9 of the Act is also devoted to
exceptions relating to age, such as benefits based on length of service,
the national minimum wage, and redundancy (severance) payments,
which are also linked to length of service. 194
Age is the only protected characteristic in British equality law where
it is possible to justify direct discrimination 195—a type of
discrimination analogous to “disparate treatment” in the U.S. 196
Regarding all the other unlawful grounds of discrimination, it is only
possible to justify indirect discrimination, which is akin to the theory of
“disparate impact” discrimination in the U.S. 197 The reason for this
disparity may be because of the potential number of specific exceptions
required if there were not a permissible general exception. Of course,
having a general exception may lead to unforeseen consequences. The
Code of Practice issued by the U.K.’s Equality and Human Rights
Commission merely states that: “A different approach applies to the
protected characteristic of age, because some age-based rules and
practices are seen as justifiable.” 198

192. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS AND EAT STATISTICS, 2010–11, at 7
tbl.1 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/publications/statistics-anddata/mojstats/employment-trib-stats-april-march-2010-11.pdf. Interestingly, the number of age
discrimination complaints dropped in the year 2011–12 to 3700 after the abolition of the
mandatory default retirement age. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, EMPLOYMENT TRIBUNALS AND EAT
STATISTICS, 2011–12, at 8 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
statistics/tribs-stats/employment-trib-stats-april-march-2011-12.pdf.
193. Equality Act, 2010, ch. 15, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 13(2). This section of the Act requires the
exceptional treatment to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim. This provides a
basis for individual employers to justify mandatory retirement in their organizations.
194. Equality Act, 2010, ch. 15, sch. 9, pt. 2 (“Exceptions Relating to Age”).
195. Equality Act, 2010, ch. 15, pt. 2, ch. 2, § 13, which defines direct discrimination, also
provides, “If the protected characteristic is age, A does not discriminate against B if A can show
A’s treatment of B to be a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.” Id. § 13(2).
196. In U.S. employment discrimination law, “disparate treatment” is a legal theory
encompassing acts of intentional discrimination. See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981) (discussing the plaintiff’s burden of proving intentional discrimination
through “disparate treatment”).
197. In U.S. employment discrimination law, “disparate impact” is a legal theory addressing
facially neutral employment policies that have an adverse impact on protected groups and cannot
be justified on the basis of job relatedness and business necessity. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem
employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority
groups . . . .”).
198. EQUAL. & HUMAN RIGHTS COMM’N, EQUALITY ACT 2010 STATUTORY CODE OF
PRACTICE: EMPLOYMENT ¶ 3.36 (2011), available at http://www.equalityhumanrights.com/
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While such exceptions would include the extra protection given to
young people, especially in relation to health and safety, no one would
quibble with such beneficial protections. Rather, of concern to older
workers is that the broadly stated general exception can be used to
justify less favorable treatment, such as compulsory retirement.
At the time of transposing the Equal Treatment Directive, the U.K.
adopted a default retirement age of 65 years. 199 It is almost
inexplicable that a measure permitting mandatory retirement should be
introduced at the same time as measures that tackle age discrimination
in employment. The likely reason for such action is that the
government gave way to employer pressure to pick an age at which
workers could be removed without recourse to claims for unfair
dismissal or age discrimination. 200 The process was accompanied by a
procedure that allowed employees to ask to work beyond the retirement
age. The employer was obliged to give each applicant a hearing but
was not obliged to give any reasons for acceptance or rejection. In
effect, it was a mandatory retirement age imposed at the discretion of
the employer.
Age Concern England, a nongovernmental organization, 201
challenged the introduction of the default retirement age in the High
Court. 202 Aspects of the case were referred to the CJEU, 203 but the
challenge proved unsuccessful. In any event, the U.K. government
abolished the default retirement age in 2011. 204 Thus, any compulsory
retirement that now takes place must be justified by the employer as
having a legitimate aim pursued through means that are appropriate and
necessary.
The question of whether and when compulsory retirement may be

uploaded_files/EqualityAct/employercode.pdf.
199. See generally Sargeant, Disproportionate Means, supra note 171, at 245 (discussing the
default retirement age of 65, established by the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006).
200. See generally Malcolm Sargeant, The Employment Equality (Age) Regulations 2006: A
Legitimisation of Age Discrimination in Employment, 35 INDUS. L.J. 209, 209–27 (2006) (arguing
that, in adopting the Employment Equality (Age) Regulations, the government mostly adopted the
approach suggested by employers).
201. Following a merger with the nongovernmental organization “Help the Aged,” Age
Concern England is now known as “Age U.K.” Details about the merged organization may be
found at http://www.ageuk.org.uk/about-us/.
202. R (on the application of Age U.K.) v. Sec’y of State for Bus. Innovation & Skills, [2009]
IRLR 1017, [1].
203. Case C-388/07 R (on the application of the Inc. Trs. of the Nat’l Council on Ageing) v.
Sec’y of State for Bus., Enter. and Regulatory Reform, [2009] IRLR 373, [1]–[3].
204. The Employment Equality (Repeal of Retirement Age Provisions) Regulations 2011, S.I.
2011/1069.
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justified has been raised in a number of cases before the CJEU. 205 An
important issue raised in these cases is under what circumstances could
a compulsory retirement age be justified by having a legitimate aim
with the means being appropriate and necessary. The CJEU has seemed
willing to accept that matters such as intergenerational change—in other
words, removing older workers to make room for younger ones—is one
of the possible legitimate aims for having such an exception. Petersen,
for example, concerned the application of a maximum age of 68 years
old for so-called “panel dentists” in Germany. 206 In a challenge to the
maximum age, the CJEU stated that it did not appear unreasonable for
member state authorities to embrace the application of an age limit,
leading to the withdrawal from the labor market of older practitioners,
in order to promote the employment of younger practitioners. 207 The
Court further stated:
It follows that, if the aim of a measure such as that at issue in the main
proceedings is the sharing out of employment opportunities among the
generations within the profession of panel dentist, the resulting
difference of treatment on grounds of age may be regarded as
objectively and reasonably justified by that aim, and the means of
achieving that aim as appropriate and necessary, provided that there is
a situation in which there is an excessive number of panel dentists or a
latent risk that such a situation will occur. 208

The CJEU found that Article 6(1) of the Equal Treatment Directive
appeared to justify making way for younger dentists, that the
encouragement of employment was a legitimate employment policy
measure, and that the compulsory retirement of older dentists could be
an appropriate and necessary measure to achieve this objective.
In Georgiev, 209 which concerned a professor in a Bulgarian
University, the CJEU reached a similar general conclusion. The
legislation in question allowed for the compulsory retirement of
professors at the age of 68. 210 According to the Bulgarian government,
the aim of the legislation was to allocate the professorial posts among
the generations to promote an exchange of experience and

205. See, e.g., Case C-341/08, Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk
Westfalen-Lippe, 2010 E.C.R. I-00047; Case C-250/09, Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v. Tehnicheski
Universitet, 2010 E.C.R. I-11869.
206. Case C-341/08, Petersen v. Berufungsausschuss für Zahnärzte für den Bezirk WestfalenLippe, ¶ 2, 2010 E.C.R. I-00047.
207. Id. [¶ 70].
208. Id. [¶ 77].
209. Case C-250/09, Vasil Ivanov Georgiev v. Tehnicheski Universitet, 2010 E.C.R. I-11869.
210. Id. [¶ 2].
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innovation. 211 Despite Mr. Georgiev arguing that the legislation did not
encourage the recruitment of young teachers, the Court reiterated its
statement from Petersen that “it does not appear unreasonable for the
authorities of a member state to consider that the application of an age
limit, leading to the withdrawal from the labour market of older
practitioners, may make it possible to promote the employment of
younger ones.” 212
There is no evidence supporting the general argument that removing
older workers provides opportunities for younger workers.
Nevertheless, the CJEU has appeared willing to accept this stance as
part of its jurisprudence. Indeed, the Court impliedly subscribes to the
“lump of labor fallacy”—the assumption that the number of jobs
available in an economy is fixed and that opportunities for the young
may be created by removing older workers from the labor force. 213
Interestingly, this assumption has been challenged in U.K. government
reports. For example, in Winning the Generation Game, a report
published in 2000, the U.K. government dismissed the lump of labor
fallacy, noting:
A misplaced belief that there are a fixed number of jobs in the
economy—a “lump of labour”—has led in the past to government
policies which wrote off large numbers of people and unintentionally
reduced employment.
One reason this fallacy is pervasive, especially among people over
50, is that it feels, at an individual level, as if there is indeed a lump of
labour. . . .
This is, however, not what happens in the labour market as a
whole. . . . Increasing the number of people effectively competing for
jobs actually increases the number of jobs in the economy.
The lump of labour fallacy ignores the fact that, in a flexible labour
market, wages can and do adjust. More people competing for jobs
means that people are less keen to demand wage increases. This
reduces inflationary pressures and allows lower interest rates (and
higher non-inflationary growth) than would otherwise be the case. 214

Despite the contested nature of the “lump of labor,” the assumption
implicitly endorsed by the CJEU has recently been embraced by the

211. Id. [¶ 46].
212. Id. [¶ 51].
213. The phrase is said to have originated in the nineteenth century in an article by U.K.
economist David F. Schloss. See Tom Walker, Why Economists Dislike a Lump of Labor, 65
REV. SOC. ECON. 279, 281 (2007) (discussing the Schloss article and the origin of “lump of
labor”).
214. CABINET OFFICE PERFORMANCE & INNOVATION UNIT, WINNING THE GENERATION
GAME 39 (2000) (emphasis omitted), available at http://www.donaldhirsch.com/generation.pdf.
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U.K. Supreme Court in Seldon v. Clarkson Wright & Jakes. 215 Seldon
involved the compulsory retirement of an equity partner in a firm of
solicitors at the end of the year in which he reached age 65. As the
U.K.’s default retirement age has been abolished, compulsory
retirement constitutes direct discrimination unless the employer can
objectively justify the dismissal. Moreover, the Court in Seldon held
“that the approach to justifying direct age discrimination cannot be
identical to the approach to justifying indirect discrimination.” 216
Where direct discrimination is at issue, justification requires that an
employer’s aims be “of a public interest nature” 217 and “consistent with
the social policy aims of the state.” 218 Additionally, proportionate
means must be used to achieve the aims—means that are “appropriate to
the aim and (reasonably) necessary to achieve it.” 219
Three of the firm’s articulated aims for the compulsory retirement
age were before the U.K. Supreme Court: (1) ensuring associates were
provided partnership opportunities in order to retain them; (2)
facilitating workforce planning by being able to ascertain when
partnership vacancies will arise; and (3) contributing to the firm’s
collegial culture by limiting partner expulsion based on performance
deficiencies. 220 As to the lawfulness of these aims, the U.K. Supreme
Court highlighted two legitimate social policy objectives that are
deemed permissible by the CJEU. The first is an “intergenerational
fairness” aim, which the Court characterized as uncontroversial. 221
This objective includes “facilitating access to employment by young
people” and “sharing limited opportunities to work in a particular
profession fairly between the generations,” presumably by removing
older workers from their jobs. 222 The second aim, seen by the Supreme
Court as more controversial, seeks to promote employee “dignity” by
eschewing “costly and divisive disputes about [older worker] capacity
or underperformance.” 223 As to whether the firm’s aims passed muster,
the first two—staff retention and workforce planning—were deemed
connected to intergenerational fairness. 224 The third—limiting partner

215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

Seldon v. Clarkson Wright & Jakes (A P’ship), [2012] UKSC 16, [50(4)(i)]–[50(4)(ix)].
Id. at [51].
Id. at [50(2)].
Id. at [55].
Id.
Id. at [10].
Id. at [56].
Id.
Id. at [57].
Id. at [67].
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expulsion due to performance deficiency—was held related to the
CJEU’s dignity objective. 225 Thus, the Court found that all three of the
firm’s aims were legitimate.
Next, the U.K. Supreme Court noted that the Employment Tribunal
should determine whether age 65 was an appropriate means for
achieving the firm’s stated objectives. 226 As noted by Lady Hale,
“There is a difference between justifying a retirement age and justifying
this retirement age.” 227 While certainly a mandatory retirement age is
possible where an employer can justify it, it may be difficult for
employers to demonstrate that a particular age—whether age 65 or
some other age—is appropriate under the circumstances in question.
Even so, an employer-justified retirement age remains possible in the
U.K. 228
In the U.K., age discrimination is clearly on different and lesser
footing than are other grounds of discrimination. Moreover, the inferior
civil rights protections afforded to workers on the basis of age turn at
least in part on the supposed economic imperative of intergenerational
fairness. As for the assumptions undergirding the “employee dignity”
aim, one might wonder whether being jettisoned from the workplace
based on age is any more dignified than losing one’s job due to
allegations of performance deficiencies. In any case, there is no
empirical research supporting the employee dignity assumption.
Compulsory retirement policies are a poor tool for combating the
stereotype of older worker performance incapacity. Such policies are
based on the idea that at least some of those who are involuntarily
retired perform at a subpar level.
E. Age Discrimination Protection in the U.S.: Narrow Statutory
Interpretation and Doctrinal Weaknesses
In contrast to the U.K.’s Equality Act 2010, the ADEA’s
effectiveness in preventing disparate treatment is not undercut by a
general employer justification. 229 Rather, the protective shortfall of the
225. Id.
226. Id. at [68].
227. Id.
228. Indeed, both Cambridge and Oxford Universities have adopted an Employer Justified
Retirement Age of 67 for academic staff. See Cambridge Academics Approve Compulsory
Retirement Age for ‘Intergenerational Fairness,’ EQUAL. LAW (May 3, 2012), http://www.
equalitylaw.co.uk/news/2305/66/Cambridge-academics-approve-compulsory-retirement-age-forintergenerational-fairness/.
229. In the U.S., there are several statutory exceptions in the ADEA. The first permits
disparate treatment (direct discrimination) where age is a bona fide occupational qualification.
This defense operates as a very hard to satisfy, narrow exception to the rule of equal treatment.
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ADEA is caused by the more onerous burden of establishing a prima
facie case of disparate treatment as compared with that of other
protected characteristics and, consequently, an increase in the ease with
which employers may defend against age discrimination suits. In short,
a case of disparate treatment age discrimination is doctrinally more
difficult to establish than a case of disparate treatment based on race,
color, religion, national origin, or sex. There is simply less protection
against age discrimination than discrimination on other bases.
Subsection 1, below, evaluates several important Supreme Court ADEA
disparate treatment cases to highlight the lesser protection afforded
victims of age discrimination and flesh out the economic imperative that
may be responsible for that disadvantage.
Additionally, ADEA plaintiffs are disadvantaged in disparate impact
(indirect discrimination) litigation in comparison with plaintiffs suing
on other grounds. This handicap is tied to the “reasonable factor other
than age” (“RFOA”) defense, which appears in the ADEA’s text and
has been interpreted by the Supreme Court. 230 Subsection 2, below,
considers two recent Supreme Court ADEA disparate impact decisions
to underscore the Court’s clear deference to, and concern for,
employers’ economic interests.
By hobbling the use of disparate treatment theory––and
simultaneously, by articulating a defense to disparate impact that is
highly deferential to employer business interests––the Supreme Court
has not only made the government’s enforcement efforts more difficult
and harmed older workers, 231 but has also shaped age discrimination
The employer must show that age, as a qualification, is reasonably necessary to its business’s
operation, and that substantially all members of the excluded group are unable to meet job
requirements or that individual screening is impossible or impractical. Under this defense, for
example, an employer might be permitted to use age restrictions to hire an actor to play a
particular role.
Matthew W. Finkin, United States, in INTERNATIONAL LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAWS 33a-1 to 33j-74 (William L. Keller & Timothy J. Darby eds., 3d ed. 2009).
The ADEA also has a bona fide seniority system exception. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2)(A) (2006). So
long as a seniority system was “not intended to evade the purposes of the Act,” an employer may
take actions that more generally benefit one age group over another. Involuntary retirement based
on age is specifically prohibited under this section of the ADEA. Since rights typically increase
with years of service and by chronological age, seniority systems that offer lesser rights to older
workers are suspect. Finkin, supra, at 33g-45.
230. In March 2012, the U.S. EEOC issued a final rule amending the agency’s age
discrimination regulations to provide guidance on the RFOA defense. Kevin P. McGowan,
EEOC Issues Final Rule under ADEA on Defense to Disparate Impact Claims, DAILY LAB. REP.,
Mar. 29, 2012, at AA-1. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce is critical of the final rule, arguing it
imposes undue burdens on employers who might avail themselves of the defense. Id.
231. See Dianna B. Johnston, Assistant Legal Counsel, U.S. EEOC, Statement before the U.S.
Comm’n on Civil Rights 12 (June 11, 2010) (on file with the author) [hereinafter Johnston
Statement] (discussing the harm done to older workers by age discrimination).
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jurisprudence to privilege economics over civil and human rights.
1. The Excessive Burden of Establishing a Case of Disparate
Treatment on the Basis of Age
As noted above, it is more difficult to establish a case of disparate
treatment on the basis of age than it is to sue on other protected grounds.
This was not always so. For many years, the U.S. Supreme Court
interpreted the ADEA in relative harmony with other antidiscrimination legislation, such as Title VII. In 2009, however, the
Court clearly rejected that approach.
In Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., the 54-year-old plaintiff
with thirty-two years of service with the firm sued over his demotion
from claims administration director to claims project coordinator. 232
His employer reassigned many of his duties to a woman in her early
40s, who had previously been his subordinate. 233 Gross asserted that he
was discriminated against, at least in part, based on age. 234 The
company asserted that Gross’s reassignment was merely part of a
corporate restructuring. 235 Instead of answering the question upon
which it had granted review, 236 the Supreme Court held that mixed
motive claims—claims involving both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory reasons—are not cognizable under the ADEA. 237
Under this new precedent, a plaintiff claiming disparate treatment
based on age must prove that age was the “but for” cause of the
challenged decision. 238 Unlike plaintiffs suing for other types of
discrimination, ADEA plaintiffs must demonstrate that age had a
decisive impact on the employer’s actions—even in cases where the
employer admits that age motivated its decision in part. 239 This leaves

232. 557 U.S. 167, 168–70 (2009).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 170–71.
235. Id.
236. See id. at 169 (“The question presented by the petitioner in this case is whether a plaintiff
must present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to obtain a mixed-motives jury
instruction in a suit brought under the [ADEA] . . . .”).
237. See id. at 175–76 (“Our inquiry . . . must focus on the text of the ADEA to decide
whether it authorizes a mixed-motives age discrimination claim. It does not.”).
238. Id. at 179.
239. At least one court has applied the reasoning in Gross to a disability discrimination claim.
See Serwatka v. Rockwell Automation, 591 F.3d 957, 963 (7th Cir. 2010) (stating that as a result
of Gross, a plaintiff is not entitled to any award because the jury found that the employer had a
mixed motive for discharging her and thus there was no but for causation as required by Gross);
Johnston Statement, supra note 231, at 13 (“Unfortunately, older workers who are subjected to
age discrimination have to pursue their ADEA rights in a legal landscape that increasingly
minimizes the significance of age discrimination. . . . The [recent Supreme Court] decisions
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no possibility of burden shifting to the employer in such cases, and
creates a legal hurdle for age discrimination victims that, for many, may
be insurmountable. 240 As one commentator has noted, Gross allows
some age-biased employers to escape liability without consequence,
under-deters illegal employment decision-making, and provides a
windfall to discriminating employers who relied on factors in addition
to age. 241
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas employed a stingy reading
of the legislation, devoid of policy considerations held either by
Congress or latent in the statute, to eliminate mixed motive analysis
from ADEA litigation. The Court interpreted the statute’s directive that
it is “unlawful for an employer . . . to . . . discriminate against any
individual . . . because of such individual’s age” 242 as requiring the
plaintiff to establish that age was the “but for” cause of the decision. 243
The majority, without explanation, interpreted “because of” language in
the ADEA differently than it had identical Title VII language in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a 1989 case involving sex discrimination. 244
Indeed, in Price Waterhouse, a plurality of the Supreme Court held that
the “because of” language in Title VII prohibits employment decisions
based in whole or in part on a protected characteristic. 245 Thus,
plaintiffs under Title VII need only prove that a protected characteristic
was a motivating factor in an employment decision, recognizing the
possibility that a complex set of reasons might be in play. 246

make age discrimination more acceptable . . . and harder to establish in court that an adverse
action was motivated by age.”).
240. Serwatka, 591 F.3d at 961.
241. Martin J. Katz, Gross Disunity, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 857, 880 (2010). Much of the
scholarly criticism of the Gross decision has been scathing. See Melissa Hart, Procedural
Extremism: The Supreme Court’s 2008-2009 Labor and Employment Cases, 13 EMP. RTS. &
EMP. POL’Y J. 253, 273–74 (2010) (“The substantive outcome in Gross is not good for
employment discrimination plaintiffs. The way the Court got there is not good for the law.”);
Charles A. Sullivan, The Curious Incident of Gross and the Significance of Congress’s Failure to
Bark, 90 TEX. L. REV. 157, 161 (2012) (“The reasoning underlying this result is, to be charitable,
less than persuasive.”).
242. Gross, 557 U.S. at 176 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)).
243. Id. at 177.
244. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion). See also Michael
C. Harper, The Causation Standard in Federal Employment Law: Gross v. FBL Financial
Services, Inc., and the Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 69,
107 (2010) (“[The Court] gives no convincing reason for rejecting the holding of Price
Waterhouse as precedent for interpreting the ADEA and instead favoring Justice Kennedy’s
dissenting interpretation of identical controlling language in Title VII.”).
245. Gross, 557 U.S. 182–83 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
240).
246. In 1991, Congress codified Price Waterhouse, in slightly modified form, by amending
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Moreover, the causation requirement embraced in Gross is especially
ill-suited for evaluating employment discrimination claims. 247 As
Justice Breyer noted in dissent:
It is one thing to require a typical tort plaintiff to show “but for”
causation.
In that context, reasonably objective scientific or
commonsense theories of physical causation make the concept of “but
for” causation comparatively easy to understand and relatively easy to
apply. But it is an entirely different matter to determine a “but for”
relation when we consider, not physical forces, but the mind-related
characterizations that constitute motive. . . . In a case where we
characterize an employer’s actions as having been taken out of
multiple motives, say, both because the employee was old and because
he wore loud clothing, to apply “but-for” causation is to engage in a
hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if the
employer’s thoughts and circumstances had been different. The
answer to this hypothetical inquiry will often be far from
obvious . . . . 248

The Gross majority instructs plaintiffs that, if they are to prevail, they
must separate all possible motives and prove that age is the overriding
cause of a negative employment decision. 249 Yet, as noted in Part I, age
stereotyping often interacts with other factors involved in employer
decision-making in complex ways. 250
For example, negative
stereotypes about older worker competence may interact with the
coding of certain jobs as less appropriate for older workers because they
are years removed from their professional training. 251 Separating the
clearly illegal negative performance stereotype from what some may
view as a legitimate rationale—i.e., that more recent training makes one
candidate better suited for the job than the other—may be virtually

Title VII to add: “[A]n unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.” See Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107, 105 Stat. 1075 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(m)
(2006)).
247. Professor Charles Sullivan has recently argued that the Supreme Court is “tortifying”
employment discrimination law doctrine— adopting common law tort-based notions of intent and
proximate causation—that may make it increasingly difficult to use the cognitive bias literature of
stereotyping in discrimination litigation. See generally Charles A. Sullivan, Tortifying
Employment Discrimination, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1431, 1454–57 (2012) (discussing the focus on
cause-in-fact in the discrimination context)
248. Gross, 557 U.S. at 189–92 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 177.
250. See supra Part I.
251. See supra notes 71–74 and accompanying text (discussing how a stereotype about older
workers can interact with other decision-making factors in such a way that it can be difficult to
determine whether a hiring decision was based on the animus or another factor).
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impossible for a plaintiff. 252 The two motives may be inextricably
intertwined; one’s view that more recent training is superior to
experience in the field may even be driven by age bias.
The Gross decision on its face appears to be a straightforward, if
terribly misguided, case of statutory interpretation. But it is not readily
apparent that an economic imperative is the impetus for the Court’s
diminishment of a civil right—the right to be free from age
discrimination. 253 Teasing out such an imperative in American law
requires looking at several ADEA decisions by the Supreme Court over
the last two decades. From this perspective, it becomes clear that the
ADEA has suffered something akin to death by a thousand cuts—cuts
driven by a belief that employers must be permitted to make
economically rational employment decisions that in some cases will be
catastrophic for older workers.
Gross, although the most recent ADEA decision, is not the only case
in which the Supreme Court has made clear that age discrimination is
different than other forms of discrimination. 254 The first inkling of
differentiation came in Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, a 1993 case in
which the plaintiff was terminated shortly before his pension was to vest
based on his years of service with the company. 255 Noting that “[i]t is
the very essence of age discrimination for an older employee to be fired
because the employer believes that productivity and competence decline
with old age,” 256 the Court held that pension status, while correlated
with age, is both analytically distinct from age and unrelated to
prohibited stereotyping. 257 Thus, while it is illegal to fire someone
252. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 250 (1989) (writing for the plurality,
Justice Brennan made this point about the difficulty of untangling motives in the context of sex
discrimination cases). See also Susan Bisom-Rapp, Of Motives and Maleness: A Critical View of
Mixed Motive Doctrine in Title VII Sex Discrimination Cases, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1029, 1040–
53.
253. Relatedly, in case law and among commentators, there is a similar dearth of discussion
about the values driving the U.S. retirement income security system. See Kathryn L. Moore, An
Overview of the U.S. Retirement Income Security System and the Principles and Values it
Reflects, 33 COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 5, 6 (2011) (“Discussions of the ‘principles’ or ‘values’
underlying employment-based pensions are rare. In the European context, in contrast,
discussions of values are more common.”).
254. See Corbett, supra note 134, at 708–09 (“Divergence between Title VII law and ADEA
law is not limited to the holding in Gross . . . . For many years, the Court has said that there are
differences between [age and other forms of discrimination] . . . and . . . that the law under Title
VII and the law under the ADEA should differ in ways reflective of those differences. . . . The
divergence invariably has produced less protection against age discrimination than is available for
the characteristics covered by Title VII.”).
255. 507 U.S. 604, 611 (1993).
256. Id. at 610.
257. Id. at 611.
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whose pension is about to vest under the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 258 unless the plaintiff can muster
evidence that the employer used pension status as a proxy for age, the
termination does not violate the ADEA. 259
Of course, bias against older workers is closely bound with the
perception that older workers are, and often may be, more costly
workers. As far back as 1965, the seminal Wirtz Report noted that
employers were loath to hire older workers due to a number of costbased reasons, such as: (1) younger workers command lower salaries;
(2) pension plans represent unwanted costs; and (3) employers are
concerned that health care and life insurance costs are greater for older
workers. 260 By both narrowly defining age discrimination as an
erroneous belief in declining performance, and characterizing costbased justifications such as pension eligibility as analytically distinct
from age, the Court significantly restricted the type of circumstantial
evidence available to prove age discrimination. 261 As a result,
employers are generally free to use salary and length of service—factors
very commonly associated with age and higher costs—as the rationale
for economically devastating employment actions, such as reductions in
force. 262 Under Biggins, such cost-based factors are unlikely to be
deemed evidence of disparate treatment based on age. Case law that
shields cost-based justifications from challenge clearly privileges the
“needs of the free market,” allowing an economic imperative to trump
the civil rights of older workers. 263
A similarly cramped interpretation—one clearly placing age
discrimination protection on poorer footing as compared to other
grounds—is apparent in the more recent decision, Kentucky Retirement
Systems v. EEOC. 264 In Kentucky Retirement Systems, a state disability
retirement plan tied benefit eligibility and calculation to normal

258. 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006).
259. Biggins, 507 U.S. at 612.
260. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 42, at 8 (listing selected reasons why employers impose
restrictions on hiring older workers).
261. See Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 572 (1996) (discussing how, by concluding that
pension status is not a proxy for age, the Court “restricted the range of circumstantial evidence
upon which a factfinder can draw the inference of discrimination”).
262. Minda, supra note 131, at 536–37.
263. See Rothenberg & Gardner, supra note 26, at 20 (“[ADEA] [c]ourt rulings over the last
fifteen years have continued to reflect a commitment to neo-liberal economics and the needs of
the free market at the expense of social justice.”).
264. 554 U.S. 135 (2008).
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retirement eligibility. 265 The latter required either twenty years of
service or five years of service so long as the worker had attained
age 55. 266 Hazardous position workers, including law enforcement
personnel, fire fighters, paramedics, and corrections officers, who were
disabled in the line of duty before retirement eligibility were permitted
to retire immediately and have their pensions calculated by imputing to
their years of service the number of years they had left to attain pension
eligibility. 267 Those disabled after reaching retirement eligibility,
however, did not have any additional years imputed for the purpose of
calculating their pensions. 268 The plaintiff, who was disabled at age 61
with eighteen years of service, argued that, had he become disabled
before age 55, he would have had additional years of service imputed
for the purpose of his pension calculation. 269
Even though the disability retirement plan clearly took account of age
to the detriment of older workers—it was facially discriminatory and, as
applied, was financially disadvantageous to older workers—the
Supreme Court held that Kentucky was actually motivated by pension
status, a factor that is analytically distinct from age. 270 Moreover,
Kentucky’s disability retirement plan did not rely on any of the core
stereotypes about older worker competency that the ADEA aims to
eradicate. 271 Finally, the Court emphasized a non-age-related rationale
behind the plan: to increase payments to disabled workers whose
careers were cut short in the line of duty. 272 Thus, the Court held that to
prove age discrimination, the plaintiff would need to demonstrate
animus beyond the express use of age as a factor in the determination of
disability retirement benefits. To meet this burden, the plaintiff would
need to establish that age “‘actually motivated’ the employer’s
decision.” 273 This additional burden—which plaintiffs who allege other
forms of disparate treatment do not bear in cases of facial
discrimination 274—may doom many ADEA claims because it is rare to

265. Id. at 137.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. Id. at 142.
271. Id. at 144–46.
272. Id. at 144–45.
273. Id. at 149–50.
274. See, e.g., City of L.A., Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)
(holding that a facially discriminatory retirement plan requiring female employees to make
greater monthly contributions than male employees violated Title VII), superseded by statute,
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071; UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.,
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find direct evidence of discriminatory animus. 275 Indeed, it is
especially difficult to find animus in the context of age discrimination
because, as noted above, age bias typically operates without the hostility
present in other forms of employment discrimination.
Professor William Corbett opines that Kentucky Retirement Systems
“narrows coverage under the ADEA, permitting a facially
discriminatory rule, apparently because of its laudable objective.” 276
While this observation brings to mind a U.K. employer’s ability to
justify direct age discrimination when its aims are public interest in
nature, 277 one should recall that in the U.K. the burden of proving
justification rests with the employer. 278 Under U.S. Supreme Court
jurisprudence, it is the employee who carries the burden. 279 Kentucky
Retirement Systems weakens protection against age discrimination by
making the prima facie case more difficult to prove.
A review of Gross, Biggins, and Kentucky Retirement Systems
demonstrates that employees receive less protection from disparate
treatment based on age than on other grounds. Moreover, Biggins

499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991) (holding that a facially discriminatory policy prohibiting female
employees who are fertile from performing jobs involving lead exposure violated Title VII).
275. See generally Susan Bisom-Rapp, Bulletproofing the Workplace: Symbol and Substance
in Employment Discrimination Law Practice, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959 (1999) (discussing how
employers take precautionary measures by creating employment documentation that gives them a
decisive advantage over employees who allege discrimination).
276. Corbett, supra note 134, at 718.
277. See Equality Act 2010 (c. 15), Sched. 9, pt. 2, § 10(2) (U.K.) (allowing an employer to
award benefits using length of service as the criterion in some circumstances). There is no need
to justify any differences related to service less than five years. Id. Where service exceeds five
years, the employer’s use of length of service needs to fulfill a business need of the undertaking.
Id. This provision has been relevant in cases where redundancy (severance) pay plans treat
longer service more favorably, the argument being that such plans may discriminate against
younger workers. See, e.g., Rolls Royce v. Unite the Union [2009] EWCA Civ 387, [6] (appeal
taken from Eng.) (addressing the question of whether length of service may be considered in
redundancy decisions); MacCulloch v. Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC, [2008] IRLR 846, [1]–[2]
(appeal taken from Eng.) (examining if both age and length of service may figure in a redundancy
determination scheme); Loxley v. BAE Sys. (Munitions and Ordnance) Ltd [2008] IRLR 853
[1]–[2] (tackling when age based discrimination may be justified). In the U.S., the ADEA’s bona
fide employee benefit plan exception allows employers to consider age in awarding employee
benefits. MICHAEL J. ZIMMER, CHARLES A. SULLIVAN & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 483 (7th ed. 2008) [hereinafter EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION]. A bona fide employee benefit plan that either provides employees equal
benefits regardless of age or “provides age-differentiated benefits but incurs equal costs” across
age groups is lawful. Id. Hence, an employer is permitted to provide lesser life insurance
coverage for older as compared with younger workers so long as it spends the same amount on
each group. Id.
278. See infra Part II.D.2
279. See supra note 229 (describing the bona fide occupational qualification defense and its
burdens on employees).

4_BISOMRAPP

2013]

3/9/2013 1:34 PM

Age Discrimination Law in the U.K. and U.S.

761

demonstrates that age discrimination law privileges economic concerns
over civil rights. 280 Put concretely, Biggins stands for the proposition
that employers who act on factors correlated with age, such as higher
salary, are generally not liable for disparate treatment based on age. 281
This is because higher salary is, like pension status, analytically distinct
from age. But might such employers be subject to disparate impact
liability? After all, choosing to downsize employees based on higher
salary is likely to have a greater impact on older workers, whose salaries
increase over the course of their careers. Unfortunately for older
workers, as discussed below, the answer is “no.”
2. Neutering Disparate Impact Theory under the ADEA
Until 2005, it was unclear whether disparate impact (indirect
discrimination) was a theory cognizable under the ADEA. However, in
what might initially appear to be a victory for plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court in Smith v. City of Jackson held that the ADEA allows for
recovery for neutral employment policies or practices that fall more
harshly on older workers. 282 Smith involved a salary increment plan by
the City of Jackson, Mississippi, which granted raises to police officers
and dispatchers based on years of service. 283 Those with fewer than
five years of service were given proportionately larger salary increases
than those with greater seniority. 284 Most officers who were age 40 or
older, therefore, received proportionately lower increases than their
younger counterparts. 285 The older employees challenged the plan as
having a disparate impact based on age; the city explained its rationale
as an attempt to bring the beginning salaries of the employees “up to the
regional average.” 286
The Court noted the similarities between language in Title VII and
the ADEA. More specifically, employer actions are prohibited when
they “‘deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise
adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual’s’
race or age.” 287 Disparate impact theory is encompassed by the ADEA

280. An employer in the U.S. may not pursue an age-specific policy based on cost savings or
profit enhancement under the bona fide occupational qualification defense. Eglit, Age Bias, supra
note 45, at 115.
281. Id. at 138.
282. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 232 (2005).
283. Id. at 231.
284. Id.
285. Id. at 242.
286. Id. at 231.
287. Id. at 235.
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because the text—text identical in Title VII—directs attention to the
effects of employer actions rather than to employers’ motives. Yet,
textual differences between the two statutes as a whole indicate that “the
scope of disparate[] impact liability under [the] ADEA is narrower than
under Title VII.” 288 Most importantly, according to the Court, the
inclusion of RFOA language within the ADEA—holding it permissible
for an employer to take action where differentiation is based on a
reasonable factor other than age—indicates that age, unlike other
protected categories, often is relevant to an employee’s ability to
perform certain jobs. 289
Turning to the facts at hand, the Smith Court held that not only did
the plaintiffs fail to demonstrate a specific employment practice and the
negative impact that it caused, but that it was absolutely clear that the
City’s actions were “reasonable given the City’s goal of raising
employees’ salaries to match those in surrounding communities.” 290
The Court found that other methods the City could have used to lessen
the impact on older workers were irrelevant. Unlike the business
necessity defense used in Title VII disparate impact cases—which
considers whether less onerous alternatives were available—the
reasonableness inquiry under the ADEA includes no such
requirement. 291 Thus, just like disparate treatment, U.S. law gives less
protection to employees on the basis of age under disparate impact
theory as compared with other discrimination grounds.
Three years after Smith, in Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Laboratory, 292 it became clear how much less protection the ADEA
affords plaintiffs in disparate impact suits. In Meacham, the Court
focused on the RFOA defense, which functions like a general
justification provision without any need for an employer to demonstrate
proportionality. In Meacham, the employer used a formula to score
employees on their performance, flexibility, and critical skills to decide
who on the payroll would be subject to a reduction in force. Of the
thirty-one employees laid off, all but one fell within the class protected
by the ADEA (i.e., they were 40 years old and older). Twenty-eight of
the employees sued claiming both disparate treatment and disparate
impact. 293 The question for the Supreme Court was whether, when

288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.

Id. at 240.
Id.
Id. at 242.
Id. at 243.
554 U.S. 84 (2008).
Id. at 87.
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proffering the RFOA defense, an employer bears both the burden of
production and of persuasion. 294
While reading the ADEA’s RFOA language as an affirmative
defense, the Court strongly signaled that, in most cases, carrying this
burden by a preponderance of the evidence would not be difficult for
most employers. It would only be the rare case “where the
reasonableness of the non-age factor is obscure” 295 that the employer
would need to do more than simply produce its rationale for using the
factor creating the disparate impact. Indeed, noted the Court, “Congress
took account of the distinctive nature of age discrimination, and the
need to preserve a fair degree of leeway for employment decisions with
effects that correlate with age, when it put the RFOA clause into the
ADEA.” 296 The problem for plaintiffs, of course, is that the use of
many cost-based factors—e.g., higher salaries and higher healthcare
costs—may appear imminently reasonable to reviewing courts.
Professor Judith Johnson, reviewing case law subsequent to Smith
and Meacham, concluded that “courts seem to be interpreting
‘reasonable’ to be whatever the employer wants it to mean.” 297 Lower
courts have taken the Supreme Court at its word, holding that the RFOA
defense is not difficult to prove. 298 A similar review of the case law by
attorneys Carla Rozycki and Emma Sullivan found that very few ADEA
disparate impact cases have survived when the RFOA defense is
raised. 299 For example, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has held
that “[c]orporate restructuring, performance-based evaluations, retention
decisions based on needed skills, and recruiting concerns are all
reasonable business considerations.” 300 A jurisprudence that gives such
great deference to business considerations and that allows great leeway
for age-correlated employment decisions clearly allows an economic
imperative to trump a civil right.
What are the real world effects of two decades of the Court slowly
dismantling protections against age discrimination? Recall that a
central distinction between the U.K. and U.S. approaches to age
discrimination law is the possibility of employer-justified compulsory

294. Id.
295. Id. at 101.
296. Id.
297. Judith J. Johnson, Reasonable Factors Other than Age: The Emerging Specter of Ageist
Stereotypes, 33 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 49, 50 (2009).
298. Id. at 51.
299. Rozycki & Sullivan, supra note 135, at 13.
300. Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006). This
case was decided after City of Jackson, but before Meacham.
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retirement in the former and the illegality of such policies in the latter.
But might employers in the U.S. accomplish something similar in
different guise?
3. How Weak Employment Law Can Lead to Involuntary Withdrawal
from the U.S. Labor Force
When Congress abolished the upper age limit for protection under the
ADEA in 1986, 301 compulsory retirement policies became illegal in
most U.S. workplaces. 302 However, employers skirting the formal
prohibition still remained a possibility. Concerned that older workers
were asked to waive their rights when presented with voluntary exit
incentives or involuntary layoffs, Congress passed the Older Worker
Benefit Protection Act of 1990 (OWBPA), 303 which mandates that
employers follow strict requirements when severing older employees
from employment and asking them to release potential ADEA
claims. 304 The protections afforded older workers under the OWBPA
are far greater than those available for workers in other protected
categories. Any waiver must be in writing, and before signing it,
employees must be advised to consult with legal counsel, provided an
extended period to consider the offer, and offered valuable
consideration for the waiver. 305 These protections aim to enhance

301. See supra note 146 and accompanying text (explaining that, before the removal of the
limit, ADEA protection did not extend to those over the age of 70).
302. While mandatory retirement is generally prohibited under the ADEA, there are two
exceptions of note. Bona fide executives or those in high policymaking positions may be retired
at 65 years of age provided that the employee has occupied the position for two years prior to
retirement and is eligible to receive defined benefits totaling at least $44,000 annually. 29 U.S.C.
§ 631(c)(1) (2006). Additionally, state and municipal employers may subject law enforcement
(police) and firefighters to mandatory retirement rules. The rationale for this latter exception is
that physical fitness and agility, which are central to those jobs, typically decline with age. See
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, supra note 277, at 482 (noting that the exception may not be
used to evade another substantive provision of the ADEA).
303. 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 626, 630 (2006).
304. Judith Droz Keyes & Douglas J. Farmer, Settlement of Age Discrimination Claims—The
Meaning and Impact of the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act, 12 LAB. LAW. 261, 267–72
(1996).
305. Waivers of Rights and Claims under the ADEA, 29 C.F.R. § 1625.22 (2012). More
specifically, the OWBPA enumerates seven factors required at a minimum for ADEA waivers to
be considered “knowing and voluntary.” Minimally, such a waiver: (1) must be written in plain
language; (2) must expressly refer to ADEA rights or claims; (3) must advise the employee to
consult with legal counsel; (4) must provide the employee at least twenty-one days to consider the
employer’s offer; (5) must provide the employee with a seven-day revocation period; (6) must not
be prospective; and (7) must be for valuable consideration. U.S. EEOC, Understanding Waivers
of Discrimination Claims in Employee Severance Agreements (2009) [hereinafter EEOC,
Understanding
Waivers],
available
at
http://eeoc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_severanceagreements.html. There are further requirements when group layoffs are contemplated. Where a
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employees’ free choice by ensuring that waivers are executed
voluntarily by those who are fully informed of their rights. 306
Although the OWBPA provisions may sound good in theory, one
wonders how they work in practice, especially in periods of economic
As the U.S. Equal
hardship 307 when layoffs are rampant. 308
Employment Opportunity Commission notes, “Employee reductions
and terminations have been an unfortunate result of the current
economic downturn. . . . Often, employers terminate older employees
who are eligible for retirement, or nearly so, because they generally
have been with the company the longest and are paid the highest
salaries.” 309
As noted above, age discrimination law generally fails to recognize
an employer’s use of such factors—high salary and long job tenure, for
example—as actionable age bias under both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theory. Employers who are litigation-averse, however,
will nonetheless ask employees to release potential claims in exchange
for severance (redundancy) pay, which is not otherwise statutorily
required in the U.S.
Older workers who accept payment and release potential claims
under the assumption that there is little else they can do become jobless
just as if they had been subject to compulsory retirement. Those who
do not sign are similarly rendered redundant, and, though they may sue,
will find their suits stymied by the evisceration of the protections

layoff is taking place, employees must be given forty-five days (rather than twenty-one days) to
consider the offer, be informed of the unit at issue, and be provided with the job titles and ages of
all those in the unit selected for the layoff as well as those not selected. Id.
306. Craig Robert Senn, Fixing Inconsistent Paternalism under Federal Employment
Discrimination Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 947, 983–85 (2011).
307. See Rothenberg & Gardner, supra note 26, at 21 (explaining how the ADEA has been
ineffective at protecting older workers during economic downturns and company downsizing).
308. One study indicates that the significant labor market effects coinciding with the global
economic crisis and its aftermath—what is known in the U.S. as the “Great Recession”—are out
of proportion to the economic distress experienced by corporations. ANDREW SUM & JOSEPH
MCLAUGHLIN, CTR. FOR LABOR MKT. STUDIES AT NORTHEASTERN UNIV., HOW THE U.S.
ECONOMIC OUTPUT RECESSION OF 2007–2009 LED TO THE GREAT RECESSION IN LABOR
MARKETS: THE ROLE OF CORPORATE DOWNSIZING, WORK HOUR REDUCTIONS, LABOR
PRODUCTIVITY GAINS, AND RISING CORPORATE PROFITS 1 (2010). Real output dropped by
2.5%, while corporate payrolls were sliced by 6%. Id. at 2. Between the fourth quarter of 2008
and the first quarter of 2010, corporate profits increased by $572 billion while wage payments
plummeted by $121 billion. Id. at 4. Many employers seized on the recession as an opportunity
for corporate restructuring aimed at profit maximization at the expense of employees. See, e.g.,
Nelson D. Schwartz, Industries Find Surging Profits in Deeper Cuts, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2010,
at A1 (reporting that many companies have cut jobs in a successful effort to improve the bottom
line profit margin).
309. EEOC, Understanding Waivers, supra note 305.
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afforded by the ADEA. They too find themselves on the street, just as
if they’d been subject to compulsory retirement. The difference,
however, is that compulsory retirement envisions an orderly transition
from work to retirement occurring at a particular age. Because
mandatory retirement is generally unlawful in the U.S., such dislocation
occurs more randomly and unexpectedly.
If layoffs occurred relatively infrequently in the U.S. or affected
small numbers of older workers, one might chalk up such displacement
to collateral damage associated with the efficient workings of a flexible
labor market. However, layoffs, very laxly regulated under U.S. law,
have become a regular part of working life, and great numbers of older
workers are adversely affected. This has been especially true during the
global economic crisis and its aftermath. 310 Although the group
comprised of workers aged 50 and over continues to have a lower
unemployment rate than the other age groups, these employees saw a
doubling in those unemployed between 2007 and 2011. 311 In 2007,
there were 1.3 million unemployed older workers compared with 3.2
million in 2011. 312 Moreover, during this time period, the number of
older workers categorized as long term unemployed rose from 300,000
to 1.8 million employees. 313 Additionally, older workers were the most
likely group to fall into the category of the very long-term
unemployed—those out of work for fifty-two weeks or more. In fact, in
2011, 41.6% of unemployed older workers were on the job market for a
year or more, an increase of twenty-seven percentage points from
2007. 314
Commentators now warn that older American workers’ historical
protections from layoffs—seniority provisions in collective bargaining
agreements or normative practices unconnected to contractual
provisions—are diminishing. 315 An overall reduction in job tenure for
310. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS, MANY
EXPERIENCE CHALLENGES REGAINING EMPLOYMENT AND FACE REDUCED RETIREMENT
SECURITY 9 (April 2012) [hereinafter UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS] (“Like many other
demographic groups, older workers have faced dramatic increases in unemployment and longterm unemployment since the recession began in 2007.”).
311. Claire McKenna, Economy in Focus: Long Road ahead for Older Unemployed Workers,
ISSUE BRIEF (Nat’l Emp. Law Project), Mar. 9, 2012, at 2, available at http://www.nelp.org/
page/-/UI/2012/NELP.older.workers.3.9.2012.pdf?nocdn=1.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 3.
314. Id.
315. See ALICIA H. MUNNELL, STEVEN A. SASS & NATALIA A. ZHIVAN, CTR. FOR RET.
RESEARCH AT BOS. COLL., WHY ARE OLDER WORKERS AT GREATER RISK OF DISPLACEMENT?
1 (May 2009), available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2009/05/IB_9-10.pdf (describing
older workers’ risk of job displacement as rising absolutely and relatively vis-à-vis prime age
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older workers is concerning because, among other factors, suffering
“job separation between ages 50 and 56, for whatever reason, is
associated with substantial reductions in the probabilities of working
full-time, or working at all, at age 60.” 316 It is becoming clear that
older workers who involuntarily lose their jobs might face great
difficulty in delaying retirement. 317 Anecdotal accounts confirm this
difficulty. 318 In fact, there was a spike in claims for Social Security
retirement benefits in 2009 following significant increases in older
worker unemployment. 319 Some 6% more older workers availed
themselves of these “benefits than would have been expected in the
absence of a recession.” 320
Given these facts, it may be legally accurate to say that compulsory
retirement is prohibited in the U.S. But given this reality, are employers
accomplishing the very same thing under a different label? True, under
the OWBPA, employers must observe strict formalities and provide
severance pay, which otherwise would not be legally mandated. And,
an older worker can refuse the consideration and sue instead. Yet, in
the face of imminent unemployment, many employees will choose
severance pay and “moving on with their lives” over litigation.
Moreover, those who sue face a set of legal rules that make it difficult to
prevail in age discrimination litigation.

workers); Daniel Rodriguez & Madeline Zavodny, Changes in the Age and Education Profile of
Displaced Workers, 56 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 498, 508 (2003) (concluding that older
workers’ relative risk of displacement has increased relative to younger workers).
316. Steven A. Sass & Anthony Webb, Is the Reduction in Older Workers’ Job Tenure a
Cause for Concern? 2 (Ctr. for Ret. Research at Bos. Coll., Working Paper 2010-20, 2010),
available at http://crr.bc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/wp-2010-20-508.pdf. See also
UNEMPLOYED OLDER WORKERS, supra note 310, at 15 (“[S]everal experts we interviewed said
long-term unemployment diminishes the likelihood older workers will ever be reemployed.”);
RICHARD W. JOHNSON & BARBARA A. BUTRICA, URBAN INST. UNEMP’T & RECOVERY
PROJECT, AGE DISPARITIES IN UNEMPLOYMENT AND REEMPLOYMENT DURING THE GREAT
RECESSION AND RECOVERY 3 (May 2012) (“Adults ages 62 and older were the least likely age
group to become reemployed once they lost their jobs.”).
317. See Charles A. Jeszeck, Dir., Educ., Workforce, & Income Sec., U.S. Gov’t
Accountability Office, Statement before the Special Committee on Aging, U.S. Senate, May 15,
2012, at 10 [hereinafter Jeszeck Statement] (“[L]ong term unemployment can motivate older
workers to file for early Social Security retirement benefits . . . because they need[] a source of
income to help pay for living expenses.”). See also LINDA LEVINE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
OLDER DISPLACED WORKERS IN THE CONTEXT OF AN AGING AND SLOWLY GROWING
POPULATION 5–6 (Jan. 15, 2010), available at http://aging.senate.gov/crs/aging22.pdf (noting that
eligibility for social security benefits, as well as private pensions and access to Individual
Retirement Accounts without penalties, contribute to older workers withdrawing from the
workforce).
318. Evans & Needleman, supra note 27; Rich, supra note 27.
319. Jeszeck Statement, supra note 317, at 11.
320. Id.
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CONCLUSION
A comparison of age discrimination protections in the U.K. and U.S.
yields convergences and divergences. Regarding convergences, both
countries have age discrimination legislation aimed at eliminating ageist
stereotypes about older worker competency and diminished
performance. Both countries have similar theories of legal action: direct
discrimination (disparate treatment) and indirect discrimination
(disparate impact). And both countries provide lesser protection for the
victims of age discrimination than for the victims of other forms of bias
and, hence, undercut the ability of law to vanquish negative
stereotyping. This lesser protection—the unwillingness to prohibit age
discrimination to the same extent as other grounds of discrimination—is
driven by an economic imperative that undermines the civil and human
rights of age discrimination victims.
As for divergences, U.K. legislation embraces a much larger
protected class than the protected class in the U.S. The problem of
discrimination against younger workers falls within the ambit of British
legislation, while bias against younger workers is not cognizable in the
U.S. (at least on the federal level). 321 U.S. policymakers must
recognize that age-based stereotyping may produce adverse results for
workers of any age. Thus, Congress should both legislatively overrule
General Dynamics Land Systems, Inc. v. Cline, 322 the case holding that
reverse discrimination claims are not cognizable within the ADEA’s
protected class, and remove the ADEA’s lower age limit of 40 years.
In the U.K., justification presents an obstacle to successful age
discrimination lawsuits, including claims involving compulsory
retirement. To counter this barrier, British policymakers ought to move
away from the European approach, which permits compulsory
retirement of older workers. Neither the empirically unproven aim of
intergenerational fairness nor the controversial argument that
compulsory retirement promotes employee dignity withstands close
analysis. Age should be treated in the same way as other protected
characteristics; there should be no general justification for direct age

321. There are a few states that recognize age bias against younger workers. For example,
New Jersey’s Law Against Discrimination provides protection from age discrimination beginning
at 18 years of age. See N.J. Office of the Attorney Gen., Age Discrimination—Your Rights,
http://www.nj.gov/lps/dcr/downloads/fact_age.pdf (last updated July 25, 2011) (explaining that
workers between the ages of 18 and 70 are covered by New Jersey’s law). Similarly, Michigan’s
Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act also prohibits discrimination on the basis of youth. Lee
Hornberger, Employment Discrimination Law in Michigan, MICH. BAR J., Sept. 2003, at 13, 14,
available at http://www.michbar.org/journal/pdf/pdf4article612.pdf.
322. 540 U.S. 581 (2004).
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discrimination. In fact, the economic imperative for justifying age
discrimination must be removed before age can be treated in the same
way as other protected characteristics.
Nonetheless, a lesson for British policymakers is that simply
eliminating compulsory retirement may not be sufficient to ameliorate
the vulnerability of older workers towards the end of their working
lives. In the U.S., compulsory retirement is generally unlawful. But
legal doctrine regarding the making of a prima facie case of disparate
treatment age discrimination presents a significant obstacle to
successful challenges to employment decision-making affecting midand late-career employees. Similarly, the RFOA defense hobbles
claims of disparate impact. When protection against age discrimination
has been so eviscerated, it matters little that compulsory retirement is
illegal. Therefore, Congress should enact legislation to statutorily
overrule Gross v. FBL Financial Services, 323 the case that eliminated
mixed motive analysis under the ADEA, and endorse Professor William
Corbett’s suggestion for a uniform standard for disparate impact
liability, including the repeal of the ADEA’s RFOA defense. 324
However, this Article’s assessment of the ADEA in action shows that
changes beyond those to age discrimination law are necessary if the
U.S. wishes to safeguard the interests of older workers. In the U.S.,
declining protection against layoffs—due to both waning coverage by
collective agreements and an unraveling of the social contract more
generally—leaves many U.S. older workers with greatly diminished
employment prospects and, in some cases, leaves them facing
involuntary early retirement. In this regard, “[g]eneral labor standards,
such as those restricting termination and layoff or requiring severance
payments, are just as important in reducing or forestalling older worker
vulnerability” as prohibiting age discrimination. 325 In other words,
older workers in the U.S., unlike workers in many other countries,
lack—but would benefit from—general protections such as good cause
protection from discharge and greater restrictions on layoffs. Since the
U.S. has tended to leave such matters to the market, one might certainly
argue that American political reality makes the embrace of enhanced
protection unlikely. To the extent that this is the case, vulnerability will
323. The Protecting Older Workers against Discrimination Act, S. 2189, 112th Cong. § 2
(2012), would have legislatively overruled Gross, restoring the availability of mixed motive
analysis in ADEA claims and making clear that complaining parties may rely on direct or
circumstantial evidence to establish their claims. The bill was not enacted. As this Article goes
to press, the bill has yet to be reintroduced in the 113th Congress.
324. Corbett, supra note 134, at 726–27.
325. Bisom-Rapp, Frazer, & Sargeant, Decent Work, Older Workers, supra note 4, at 117.
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continue to haunt America’s older workers.
Is the U.S. system, which allows these conditions to flourish, better
than the U.K. approach, which provides for an employer-justified
retirement age? Considering that the outcome for many older workers
in both countries is consignment to precarious working status, it is
difficult to rate one system as more beneficial for older workers than the
other. Ultimately, at a minimum, if the U.K. and U.S. are to vanquish
age discrimination in the workplace, that form of bias must be placed on
equal footing with other forms of bias. Beyond taking steps towards
this goal, however, and especially in the wake of the global financial
crisis, a rebalancing of the needs of both human beings and economic
organizations is necessary. 326

326. See Alain Supiot, A Legal Perspective on the Economic Crisis of 2008, 149 INT’L LAB.
REV. 151, 160 (2010) (arguing for effective control of markets and to “restore the order of ends
and means as between human needs and economic and financial organization”).

